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I. INTRODUCTION
The format of this survey' is somewhat changed from that of past
surveys. Rather than attempting to comment upon a large number of
-cases in brief form, the present authors have selected a fewer number of
cases, treating such cases in depth through illustration of their factual
and legal setting. Other sources2 are available for those wishing to con-
sult a compendium of all decisions covering the subject matter during the
survey period.
II. VENDOR AND PURCHASER
A. Jurisdiction
A necessary prerequisite for the maintenance of an action either for
damages or for specific performance based upon a contract for the sale
of realty is the establishment of the court's jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant. A serious problem arises in this regard when the pros-
pective action is against an out-of-state purchaser, based upon his breach
of contract. In Lyster v. Round, the purchaser, a nonresident of Florida,
entered into a written contract with the vendor for the sale of the ven-
dor's home. Upon execution of the contract, the purchaser gave to the
vendor his personal check in the sum of $10,700 as a good faith de-
posit required by the contract. Upon returning to his Michigan resi-
dence, the purchaser promptly stopped payment on the check. Vendor
instituted suit praying for judgment in the full amount of the check,
obtaining constructive service upon the purchaser under the "doing
business" long-arm statute.4 The purchaser filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over his person. Said mo-
tion was denied, and purchaser appealed.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed the order
denying purchaser's motion to dismiss. To establish jurisdiction under
1. The period covered is the 1971-73 biennium, or more specifically, from volume 250
through volume 284 of the Southern Reporter, Second Series.
2. See R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS (Supp. 1973).
3. 276 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
4. FLA. STAT. § 48.181(1) (1971).
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the long-arm statute, the court noted that isolated acts which could
not be held to constitute the operation, conduct, engagement in or carry-
ing on of a business venture are not sufficient to warrant the applica-
tion of the statute. Only with a clear showing that the transaction out
of which the cause of action arises is by its very nature a business ac-
tivity or a link in a chain of acts collectively comprising a business
activity will jurisdiction be established. The isolated act of buying a
home in Florida does not constitute such a doing of business, and, there-
fore, constructive service of process under the statute is inapplicable.
Given the fact that a large percentage of contracts for the sale
of realty in Florida involve out-of-state residents, the above decision
would appear to create a hardship on the Florida resident engaging in
the sale of realty. Effective July 1, 1973, an expansion of the long-arm
statute5 provides a possible remedy. Though it is unclear whether that
statute is intended to be applicable to the instant situation, it provides
for jurisdiction on the basis of a single act constituting a breach of con-
tract, and thus relieves the plaintiff of showing a course of business on the
part of the defendant as required in Lyster v. Round."
B. Terms-Implied Warranties
The sale of realty has historically been treated as a unique enter-
prise, with the result that developments in the law relating to the sale
of chattels offered no shelter for the disgruntled homebuyer. Thus, there
existed an incongruous situation where one who bought a chattel as simple
as a walking stick was entitled to get his money back if the article was
not of merchantable quality, but the purchaser of a $50,000 home ordi-
narily had no remedy even if the foundation proved to be so defective
that the structure collapsed into a heap of rubble." In Gable v. Silver,"
the Supreme Court of Florida attempted to remedy this situation by
providing that an implied warranty of fitness and merchantibility extends
to the sale of newly built houses and condominiums.
In Gable, plaintiffs were purchasers of a new condominium. After
moving in, the air conditioning system began to malfunction. Numerous
service calls to the builder met with little success. After more than one
year of such inaction, the entire air-conditioning system malfunctioned.
The system was eventually replaced at a cost to the plaintiffs of over
$5,000, since the one year warranty had expired.
Before reaching the dispositive question, the court decided two
preliminary questions. First, it held that the express warranty is not in-
5. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-179, creating FLA. STAT. § 48.193.
6. 276 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
7. See Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Texas 1968).
8. 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972), adopting 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) [hereinafter
referred to as Gable]. See generally Note, Implied Warranties In the Sale oj Real Estate,
26 U. MiAMI L. REV. 838 (1972).
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consistent with and in no way negates or excludes implied warranties of
fitness and merchantability. Second, it held that the air-conditioning sys-
tem was realty, rather than personalty, since it was attached to the free-
hold and immovable. With the path open, the court extended an implied
warranty of fitness to the sale of realty, and the verdict for the plaintiff
was affirmed.
It is to be noted that the court's decision leaves for future determina-
tion many important questions. In Gable, the plaintiff was the first
purchaser; thus there was privity of contract. The court expressly left
open the question of how far the warranty would extend:
We ponder, but do not decide, what result would occur if more
remote purchasers were involved. We recognize that liability
must have an end but question the creation of any artificial
limits of either time or remoteness to the original purchaser.'
The court also did not examine closely the exact nature of the warranty it
was imposing. Although it is clear that the warranty is not limited to
defects which would render the house uninhabitable, as has been the
case in some other jurisdictions, the extent of the warranty in time is
not stated. It is unsettled whether the warranty is breached, if at all,
at the time of first occupancy, or whether the warranty is ongoing for a
reasonable period of time. Such a determination is important in relation
to the application of the statute of limitations. However, it is clear that
the instant case is not an authoritative attempt to answer all questions in
relation to the mechanics of the warranty, but rather is a much-heralded
step in the renovation of some of the historical inequities found in the
body of property law.
The application of Gable is just beginning. In Burger v. Hector,"0
the plaintiff purchased a lot and then selected the defendant to construct
a house according to plans approved by the purchasers. After occupancy,
drainage problems became apparent. Following heavy rains, water
ponded on plaintiff's lot and rose into their house, causing substantial
damage. In bringing suit, the plaintiffs relied upon Gable, asserting that
there existed an implied warranty of suitability. Subsequent to a jury
verdict, the court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
plaintiffs appealed.
The court noted that the plaintiff's complaint was not with the
house that the defendant had constructed, but with the lot they had
chosen. Although a warranty of fitness and merchantability existed with
regard to the house, the court refused to find that there was any warranty,
either express or implied, regarding the lot upon which the house was
constructed, to the effect that said lot would have average or high percola-
9. Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11, 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
10. 278 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
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tion soil such as would withstand flooding waters. Since no warranty
could be found, a judgment in favor of the defendant was proper.
C. Notice
The recording acts protect only subsequent bona fide purchasers
without notice against unrecorded instruments. A person with notice gets
no protection; therefore, a determination as to what constitutes sufficient
notice is vitally important."1 In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Laws,12
the land in question was in possession of a lessee with an option to pur-
chase. Neither the lease nor the option was recorded. The lessee culti-
vated the land and was in possession for 30 to 45 days. Approximately
six months after the lessee entered into possession, the lessor entered into
a lease of oil, gas and mineral rights with Humble Oil.
In affirming the cancellation of Humble's oil and gas lease, the court
rejected the contention that the cultivation of land was not sufficient to
put Humble on notice as to the option. Under the facts of the instant
case, the exclusive possession by the lessee was more than adequate to
put third parties upon inquiry as to his interest in the occupied lands.
As stated by the court, "[a]ctual possession is constructive notice to all
the world of whatever rights the occupants have in the land."1" It is of
note that such a finding does not seem to be predicated on the possession
being inconsistent with record title.
D. Formalities
Considerable dispute has arisen as to the formalities required of
a contract to convey real property, particularly relating to the require-
ment of two subscribing witnesses. Florida Statutes section 725.01 (1971)
applies specifically to contracts to convey, stating that such contracts
must be signed by the party to be charged. The statute makes no refer-
ence as to the necessity of subscribing witnesses. However, it was argued
in Radabaugh v. Warel 4 that such contracts must also comply with the
requisites of Florida Statutes section 689.01 (1971). On its face this
statute does not apply to contracts, but merely requires that instruments
creating or transferring an estate or freehold interest must be signed in
the presence of two subscribing witnesses. The court in Radabaugh
argued that such statute of necessity had to apply to contracts to convey,
for:
[t]o hold otherwise would be to effect the transfer of property
by a decree of specific performance although the contract
11. See 1 R. Boyim, FiORMA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 27.01, at 713 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as BoYERa].
12. 272 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
13. Id. at 842.
14. 241 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) [hereinafter referred to as Radabaugh].
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forming the basis of the transfer would have small resemblance
to the formality with which it was intended that conveyances
of real property should be accomplished. 5
In Koplon v. Smith," the Supreme Court of Florida rejected this
broad conclusion. The purchasers brought an action for specific per-
formance of a deposit receipt contract for non-homestead property. How-
ever, the deposit receipt did not contain the signature of two subscribing
witnesses. The trial court entered judgment for the purchasers, and said
judgment was affirmed.1 7 The vendors filed a petition for writ of certi-
orari, alleging conflict with the decision in Radabaugh. In denying the
writ, the court noted that the broad language of Radabaugh went beyond
the facts of that case. Its holding should be limited to homestead spe-
cifically. Thus, as to non-homestead property, there is no requirement of
subscribing witnesses as a predicate for specific performance. 8
In Koplon, the court apparently has sorted out previous conflict
regarding the requirement of subscribing witnesses. However, since the
issue was not presented to the court, the opinion failed to consider the
validity of the distinction given to homestead property. Such distinction
was supported by Zimmerman v. Diedrich.9 Relying upon article X,
section 4 of the old constitution,2 0 providing that homestead property
could only be alienated through instruments "duly executed," and upon
the provisions of Florida Statutes section 708.07 (1969),21 relating to
coverture as an impediment to decrees of specific performance, the court
concluded that as much formality was required in the execution of con-
tracts for the sale of homestead property as must be followed in the exe-
cution of contracts for the sale of the separate property of a married
woman or the relinquishment of her dower, and, therefore, the signature
of two subscribing witnesses was required.
Today, the basis for the above distinction may no longer exist.
There is no longer any constitutional provision stating that homestead
property can only be alienated through instruments duly executed.
Further, Florida Statutes section 708.07 (1969)22 has been repealed.
Thus, when presented with the proper case, the distinction made in
Zimmerman may be questioned by the court. Unless the court wishes
to adopt the rationale of Radabaugh, indirectly repudiated in Koplon,
perhaps the logical position is that a contract for the sale of realty,
whether homestead or non-homestead, need only comply with Florida
15. Id. at 739.
16. 271 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Koplon].
17. Koplon v. Smith, 264 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
18. See Zimmerman v. Diedrich, 97 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1957).
19. Zimmerman v. Diedrich, 97 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1957) [hereinafter referred to as Zim-
merman].
20. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (1898).
21. FLA. STAT. § 708.07 (1969) repealed by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-4.
22. Id.
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Statutes section 725.01 (1971) and, therefore, that it need be signed
only by the party to be charged in order to be specifically enforceable.
E. Reformation
In General Development v. Kirk,28 the court had before it, in a
case of first impression, the question of whether one not a party to a
deed has standing to seek reformation of that deed. The facts of the
case are at the least confusing. Suffice it to say that beginning with a
tract of 337 acres, the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund
(TIIF) intended to convey a tract of 20 acres to one Conway, and the
remainder, or 317 acres, to General Development's predecessor in title.
Approximately fifteen years after these conveyances, it was discovered
that the description used in Conway's deed covered not twenty but 57.8
acres, the excess acreage covering land which was thought to have been
owned by General Development. General Development therefore brought
suit to reform not their own deed, but the deed given by the TIIF to
Conway. The trial court ruled that the corporation lacked standing to
reform the Conway deed and granted summary judgment.
In reversing the trial court, the second district rejected a solution
based on the concept of privity. Rather than privity, the legitimate in-
terest of the party bringing suit should be the determinative factor. As
stated by the court:
Standing is, in the fihal analysis, that sufficient interest in the
outcome of litigation which will warrant the court's entertain-
ing it. It is beyond doubt that standing is, in most states, no
longer determined by first determining some abstract question
such as "privity". In this case it is clear that General Develop-
ment reasonably contends that the extent of the property con-
veyed to the Conways determined the extent of that conveyed
to . . . its predecessor in title. We think the courts of Florida
should be open to the presentation of such a contention as
this .2 14
F. Damages
Following the law applicable to all contracts, it has been held that
a stipulation for the payment of liquidated damages in a contract to
purchase real property is valid and will be enforced, whereas a pro-
vision for a penalty or a forfeiture is invalid and unenforceable. 2 5
Florida cases have agreed upon the proposition that if damages are
"readily ascertainable," a liquidated damages provision in a contract is
23. 251 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
24. Id. at 286.
25. Pembroke v. Caudill, 160 Fla. 948, 37 So. 2d 538 (1948).
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in essence a penalty and must therefore be struck down.2" However,
conflict has arisen as to when such damages must be readily ascertain-
able; one case holding that the damage provision will be a penalty if
the damages are readily ascertainable at the time of breach, 7 and an-
other holding that it was necessary for the damages to be readily
ascertainable at the time the contract was formed in order for the
damage provision to be viewed as a penalty.28
Such conflict has been expressly resolved by the Supreme Court of
Florida in Hutchison v. Tompkins.2 The contract in question contained
a liquidated damages clause which provided that, upon the purchaser's
breach, the vendor could elect to retain a cash deposit of $10,000 held
in escrow. The vendor alleged that the purchasers had failed to perform,
and that the escrow without authorization had returned the deposit to
the purchasers. The vendors sought damages in the amount of $10,000
from the purchasers. The trial court, however, dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action.
On the authority of Pembroke v. Caudill,"° the District Court of
Appeal affirmed 8' and held that the liquidated damages provision of the
contract constituted a penalty as a matter of law. The supreme court
rejected this approach. It noted that in real estate transactions, the
measure of damages is determined by calculating the difference between
the contract price and the market value of the land at the time of breach.
This measure is nearly always ascertainable at the time a contract is
breached. Thus, if the Pembroke rule is followed, the liquidated damages
provision would be a penalty as a matter of law. However, such ap-
proach must of necessity have a chilling effect on contract negotiations
for the sale of land, where the parties wish to include a provision for
liquidated damages. Noting that the court had no desire to invalidate the
liquidated damages provisions of nearly all contracts for the sale of land,
the Pembroke rule was specifically rejected in favor of a holding that
the damages must be ascertainable at the time the contract is made in
order for the liquidated damages provision to be viewed as a penalty.
As opposed to the Pembroke rule, this rule would validate almost
any liquidated damages provision in a sales contract. The court went
so far as to realize that in light of the present status of the land sale
market in Florida, it is generally impossible to say at the time a con-
tract for sale is drawn what the vendor's loss will be if the purchaser
fals to close. This is not to say, however, that any liquidated damages
clause can be enforced. The forfeiting party can always look to equity
to relieve against forfeiture if the liquidated damages provision appears
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
29. 259 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1972).
30. 160 Fla. 948, 37 So. 2d 538 (1948) [hereinafter referred to as Pembroke].
31. Hutchison v. Tompkins, 240 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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unconscionable in light of the circumstances existing at the time of
breach.
The law in regard to liquidated damages, previously discussed, ap-
plies generally to those situations where no deposit or deferred pay-
ments have actually been received by the nondefaulting party, or where
the deposit has been inadvertantly returned, and where the nonde-
faulting party brings suit to enforce the provision. However, in many
cases where the vendee makes a deposit or deferred payment, and upon
his own default, sues to recover all or part of the money paid, the
courts have not considered the liquidated damages rule, but rather
have applied the rule that a vendee in default cannot recover from the
vendor monies paid in part performance of the contract.8 3 Thus, by
generally upholding the validity of most liquidated damages provisions
in sales contracts, the court has effectively resolved the conflict be-
tween the two rules, since the utilization of either rule will in most
instances allow the vendor to retain monies paid in part performance
by the vendee.
It is not to be concluded that, as a result of the "no recovery" rule
and the validity of liquidated damages provisions, the defaulting ven-
dee will of necessity be in a completely remediless situation. In many
instances, such defaulting vendee will have an equity of redemption,
forcing a seller to bring foreclosure proceedings to eliminate the in-
terest of the vendee. Though most properly descriptive of the interest
of a mortgagor, it seems proper to apply the principles of equity of
redemption to any situation where a contract is essentially a substitute
for a mortgage, or where a contract is really nothing more than a security
device.84
In H & L Land Co. v. Warner,"' a purchaser brought suit against
the vendor for specific performance of an installment land sale con-
tract, and the vendor counterclaimed for removal of the contract as a
cloud on its title. The term of the contract was ten years. The pur-
chaser was entitled to a deed only upon payment of all installments
plus interest. The purchaser paid the required installments for approx-
imately six years, but then fell into default. After four years of silence,
the purchaser tendered all monies due under the contract, and de-
manded the deed. The vendor refused to accept such payment. The
contract provided that upon failure of the purchaser to pay any install-
ment, the seller was entitled to terminate the contract, repossess the
land, and keep all monies already received. The trial court held that
the parties were essentially in the same position as if the vendor held
a purchase money mortgage, thus finding for the purchaser.
32. See Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1972).
33. E.g., Mulford v. Knight Center, Inc., 258 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
34. See BosER, supra note 11, § 4.07[3], at 64.
35. 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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In affirming the decision of the lower court, the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, found that the substance, not the form, of the
transaction should be controlling. Thus, there should not be substantial
difference based solely upon whether a purchaser's obligation to pay
monies due under a contract is secured by a purchase money mortgage
or an installment land sales contract. The vendor's rights under such
an installment land sales contract are therefore limited:
We hold that the vendor under a specifically enforceable
installment land sales contract, who has received part of the
purchase price and has given the vendee possession of the
land and the benefits and burdens of ownership, is in essen-
tially the same position as a vendor who has conveyed the
legal title and taken back a purchase money mortgage, and
he cannot unilaterally and summarily extinguish the vendee's
equitable title upon the vendee's default.8"
Thus, in looking to the substance of the transaction, it appears that
an equity of redemption will exist under a sales contract only where the
contract is essentially a security for an obligation to pay the purchase
price. The court indicated that the above holding does not apply to
short-term sales contracts, intended solely to govern the rights and
obligations of the parties during the period precedent to closing. Simi-
larly, it would not apply to a situation in which the purchaser does not
have the right to possession or the benefits and burdens of ownership,
for in such situation the contract would necessarily evidence something
more than a mere security interest on the part of the vendor."T
G. Legislation
In 1972, the legislature adopted the General Uniform Partnership
Act to become effective on January 1, 1973.88 Under the Act, all prop-
erty originally brought into the partnership, or subsequently acquired
by purchase or otherwise on account of the partnership, is considered
partnership property. 9 When title to real property is in the partner-
ship name, any partner may convey partnership property in the partner-
ship name as long as his act will bind the partnership. If the title to
the property is in all the partners' names, then all must execute the
conveyance.40 If the title to the property is not in all of the partners'
names, then those partners of record title may convey the land, but
the partnership may retrieve the land if the conveyors did not have
authority to bind the partnership, unless the purchaser or his assignee
36. Id. at 295.
37. Id.
38. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-108, creating FLA. STAT. §§ 620.560-.770.
39. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-108, § 8.
40. Id., I 10(l).
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is a holder for value without knowledge that the partners had exceeded
their authority.4' A partner's right in specific partnership property is
not subject to dower, curtesy, or allowances to widows, heirs, or next
of kin.42 Hence, it is not necessary for partners' wives to join in con-
veyances of partnership property.
In order to correct developer abuses in the sale of subdivided land
via telephone, the legislature has enacted various provisions to protect
the purchaser.4 The legislation provides in part that no person may
dispose of any interest in subdivided land by solicitation of sales by
long distance telephone unless the prospective purchaser has either
personally inspected the property or the subdivider has furnished the
prospective purchaser both a synopsis of the sales script used and a
public offering statement which have been approved by the land sales
division of the state. Failure to comply with these provisions will en-
title the purchaser to a refund of the total amount paid and a reason-
able attorney's fee if suit has been filed.
III. ESTATES AND RELATED INTERESTS
A. Dower
A woman may relinquish her dower right in any real property
by joining in the conveyance or mortgage thereof, or by a separate in-
strument without the joinder of her husband. 4 In In re Estate of
Hiley,45 the husband and wife had conveyed entireties property to the
husband. The deed expressly stated that the conveyance included any
dower right of the wife. Upon the husband's death, the wife neverthe-
less filed a claim for dower.
Holding that the wife had a valid dower claim, the court noted that
the purported conveyance of the dower right was ineffective. Since the
property was held as an estate by the entireties, the wife before con-
veyance had no right of dower. This result is predicated on Florida
Statutes section 689.15 (1971) which was interpreted by the court as
implying that the right of survivorship in the surviving widow is pre-
ferable to her dower right, and, therefore, a right of survivorship pre-
cludes any dower right. Thus, in the instant case the wife's dower right
was not existant until after the conveyance of the entireties property
to the husband and consequently could not be relinquished through
that conveyance.
Article 10, section 5 of the Florida constitution provides that
there shall be no distinction between married men and married women
41. Id., § 10(2)
42. id., § 25(e).
43. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-175, amending FLA. STAT. § 478.23 (1971).
44. FLA. STAT. § 694.02 (1971).
45. 262 So. 2d 476 (Fa. 4th Dist. 1972).
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in the holding, control, and disposition of their property, except that
dower and curtesy may be established and regulated by law. Although
the legislature apparently had the power to authorize separate treat-
ment of men and women with regard to dower and curtesy, they acted
to abolish such distinction. By the amendment of various statutes" re-
lating to dower rights, two significant steps were accomplished. First,
a woman's inchoate dower right was eliminated-thus, the dower right
consists only of one third in fee simple of the real and personal prop-
erty owned by the deceased spouse at the time of death, and does not
include a one third interest conveyed without joinder of the widow.
Second, a right of curtesy for married men, referred to as a dower right
by the statute, was established, such right to consist also of one third in
fee simple of the real and personal property owned by the deceased
spouse at time of death.
B. Concurrent Estates
In La Pierre v. Kalergis 7 a deed from a father and mother to the
mother and daughter provided for the right of survivorship between
the parties. Holding that said deed created a joint tenancy, the District
Court of Appeal, First District, 8 discussed the applicability of Florida
Statutes section 689.15 (1971). Since that statute purports to abolish
the common law doctrine of the right of survivorship,49 the court rea-
soned that it also abolished the requirements of the four unities-
time, title, interest, and possession. The Supreme Court of Florida ex-
pressly rejected the language of the district court, finding that the
statute had no such effect, and that any viable joint tenancy must always
possess the characteristics of unity of possession (joint ownership and
control), unity of interest (the interests must be the same), unity of
title (the interests must originate in the same instrument), and unity
of time (the interests must commence simultaneously).50
C. Reverters and Restrictive Covenants
1. IN GENEMAL
The desire to obtain a protected community, developed according
to the plan and design of the individual sponsor, has led to various
techniques for the private regulation of land use. The development of
46. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-107, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 731.34, .35(l)-(3), .36, 733.09,
.10, .11, .13,.14 (1971).
47. 257 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1971).
48. La Pierre v. Kalergis, 251 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
49. The statute provides in pertinent part that "[tihe doctrine of the right of survivor-
ship in cases of real estate and personal property held by joint tenants shall not prevail in
this state . . . unless the instrument creating the estate shall expressly provide for the right
of survivorship . . . ." FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1971).
50. La Pierre v. Kalergis, 257 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1971).
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governmental zoning activity has augmented but not supplanted the
practice of privately controlling the use of land, for the two are not
necessarily incompatible; cooperatively employed they can be more
effective than the sole use of either. Private regulation is accomplished
primarily through one of two devices: (1) A limitation placed upon
the estate granted, whereupon a termination of the estate results in
the event the regulation is breached, and (2) a covenant or promise as
to the use of the land conveyed, a breach of which results in liability
for damages or appropriate equitable enforcement.51
During the survey period, Florida courts have been faced with
numerous attempts to regulate the use of land utilizing the devices out-
lined above. Faced with conflicting and competing interests, generally
in the form of the public as opposed to the private interest, the courts
have held that such regulatory devices are not immune from attack, i.e.,
there are limitations on the extent to which one can privately regulate
the use of land.
In University Park Civic Association, Inc. v. Ansbacher,5" 2 a land
use control in the form of a limitation upon the estate granted was
utilized. The civic association had opposed the rezoning of property
adjacent to their community for commercial purposes. To induce the as-
sociation to withdraw their opposition, the developer of the commercial
property agreed to convey to the association a buffer strip between
the subdivision and the commercial property. Said grant was in the
form of a fee simple determinable, whereby title to the property would
revert to the developer if the association ceased to use the strip for
"bona fide civic association purposes." At all times subsequent the land
was left vacant by the civic association. Approximately eight years after
this conveyance, the successor to the reversionary interest brought suit
to quiet title. In granting summary judgment in favor of the successor,
the trial court held that the conveyance to the civic association re-
quired by its terms that some affirmative use be made of the property,
such as the erecting, constructing, or installing on the land buildings,
facilities, or other improvements. The continued use of the land in its
natural vacant state as a buffer area could not be considered such an
affirmative use.
In reversing the trial court, the District Court of Appeal, First
District, broadly interpreted the requirements of a "bona fide civic
association purpose," holding that the accepted and widely utilized
planning technique of buffer zones could be considered such a use. The
court could find no difference between the use of the land as a park
or playground and the use of the land as a buffer in the instant appli-
cation:
51. See generally 1 BoYaa supra note 11, § 24.02, at 568.
52. 259 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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Such land use serves to separate and set apart residential
areas from commercial or industrial areas and protect the
former against the depreciating influences which flow from
activities permitted in the latter. The use of the strip of land
involved in this case as a buffer area to protect the value and
integrity of the residential property in the subdivision is just
as much a bona fide civic association purpose as would the
use of the land for a park, playground, or other similar fa-
cility.53
A fee simple determinable can effectively control the use of land
even when the grant is to the state or a subdivision thereof. In Metro-
politan Dade County v. Leslie Enterprises, Inc.,54 a conveyance by
respondent to Dade County provided that if the land should ever not
be used for public park or recreational purposes, then title would revert
to respondent. The county failed to use the land for such purpose and
suit was brought to enforce the reverter clause. By way of defense, the
county claimed that it was immune from suit, since Florida Statutes
section 69.041 (1967) provided that an action to quiet title could be
brought only when the state had or claimed a mortgage or other lien on
the property. In the instant case, there was no allegation of such mort-
gage or lien.
The supreme court rejected this contention, noting that effective
July 1, 1970, the above statute was amended to provide that a suit to
quiet title may be brought whenever the state has or claims any adverse
interest in the title to the property involved. 5 Since the amendment
was remedial, in conferring a remedy or means to be employed in en-
forcing a right or in redressing an injury, rather than upsetting vested
rights, it could be applied retrospectively. Therefore, no claim to sov-
ereign immunity could be sustained.
Leslie in no way implies that such planning devices are always
effective as against the state or a subdivision thereof. In Kosanke v.
City of St. Petersburg Beach,56 the city proposed construction of rec-
reational facilities on land that had been dedicated as a horticultural
park. The situation was further complicated by the fact that a portion
of the park area carried a restrictive covenant whereby such land could
only be used for villa sites and a church site. The proposal of the city
was opposed by a group of local property owners, contending that they
had a private right to have the property continually maintained as a
horticultural park and also to have certain designated areas restricted
for use as villa sites and a church site respectively.
In rejecting the contention that the surrounding owners had a
right to have the property maintained as a horticultural park, the court
53. Id. at 750.
54. 257 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Leslicj.
55. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-326, amending FLA. STAT. § 69.041 (1969).
56. 256 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1972).
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developed an expanding concept of the public park. While at one time
a park was understood to be an open square or plaza, containing merely
shade trees and seating, today a park must be viewed not only as
ornamental, but also as a place for amusement and recreation. Thus,
while the entire area of a park may not be converted to playground or
recreational uses, it is nevertheless proper and legitimate that a reason-
able portion of a park area be set aside for recreational purposes, con-
sidering the size and location of the park, its environment, the density
of the population and the needs of the public.57 The court went on to
indicate that such recreational facilities might include tennis courts,
playgrounds, swimming facilities, areas for athletic sports, and adja-
cent parking facilities for the convenience of the public. However, any
such development must be balanced against the traditional function of
the park, and, therefore, a substantial portion of the park area must
remain in grass, trees, shrubs, and flowers.
As to the restrictive covenants on the use of the land for villa and
church sites, the court relied on Board of Public Instruction v. Town
of Bay Harbor Island,58 holding that such restrictive covenants are not
generally enforceable to prevent a governmental entity from erecting,
establishing, and operating a public building or facility on the premises
involved. This result is predicated on the fact that the right to enforce
a restrictive covenant, as against a governmental unit, is not a property
right within the constitutional guarantees.
Although the above-described forfeiture provisions and restrictive
covenants may provide an effective tool for the developer in controlling
the structure and design of the development, such provisions may be-
come a trap for the unwary, in that the court has shown a willingness
to look beyond the formalities involved to prevent overreaching on the
part of the developer. In Baggett v. Boege,"9 the developer sold lots in
a subdivision for use by mobile homes. A recorded instrument entitled
"Covenants Restricting Use of Land" provided in pertinent part that
the developer reserved the right to furnish water to the lots at a cost
of $8.00 per month. The developer undertook his right to furnish water
to the lots for a period in excess of five years, at which time he dis-
continued the water supply. Thereupon a group of landowners filed suit
to enjoin the developer from discontinuing service.
At first glance, the action by the lot owners would seem unsup-
ported in that the restrictive covenant at least on its face created no
enforceable right on their part. However, the court noted that it would
not be bound by the face of the covenant, but would look to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the transaction. In the instant case, the devel-
oper's sales brochures stated as a feature of the development an un-
57. See McLauthlin v. City and County of Denver, 131 Colo. 222, 280 P.2d 1103 (1955).
58. 81 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1955).
59. 264 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
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metered supply of pure fresh water. The brochure further noted that
the restrictions were designed to protect the purchaser, in that the pro-
visions could not be changed for thirty years without a vote of the
lot owners. In light of these circumstances, the court found that the
covenant gave the developer only an initial election as to the supply
of water. Once such election was made, the covenant provided the de-
veloper no further election to discontinue the water service. Therefore,
the discontinuance by the developer constituted a breach of an assumed
legal obligation, entitling the lot owners to relief.
2. REVERSIONARY INTERESTS
It is generally held that when an owner of land has it mapped
and platted, showing subdivisons with spaces for intervening streets,
and then conveys parcels of said subdivision subject to the map or
plat, the owner evinces an intention to dedicate an easement in the
streets or other highways to the public use, the title to the land remain-
ing in the owner or the grantees. 60 Further, it is generally held that the
title of the grantees of subdivisions abutting on such streets extends, in
the absense of a contrary showing, to the center of such street, subject
to the public easement."'
At times, developers have attempted to defeat the operation of
this rule, claiming title to the street when it has been abandoned by
the public. Generally, however, Florida courts have ruled against
such claims, holding that the reversionary interest in the streets was
held by the grantees of the abutting property.68
In Peninsular Point, Inc. v. South Georgia Dairy Co-op, Inc., 4 the
court recognized that the grantees of the abutting property will gen-
erally hold title extending to the center of the street, but that such rule
can be defeated where there is a clear intention on the part of the
grantor to retain the reversionary interest. The recorded plat in that
case bore a dedication which stated in material part that the grantor
"does hereby dedicate to the perpetual use of the public, as public
highways, the streets as shown hereon, reserving unto itself, its heirs,
successors, assigns, or legal representatives, the reversion or reversions
of the same, whenever abandoned by the public or discontinued by
law."6 It was held that such reservation was sufficient to overcome
the presumption that the grantees of abutting property took title to the
60. Smith v. Horn, 70 Fla. 484, 70 So. 435 (1915).
61. Id.
62. E.g., Servando Building Co. v. Zimmerman, 91 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1956); Smith v.
63. E.g., Servando Building Co. v. Zimmerman, 91 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1956); Smith v.
64. 251 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
Horn, 70 Fla. 484, 70 So. 435 (1915).
Horn, 70 Fla. 484, 70 So. 435 (1915).
65. Id. at 691.
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center of the street. Thus, when the street was abandoned, title re-
verted to the developer, and not to the grantees.
The above result may be avoided in many cases as a result of
legislation enacted in 1972.66 Florida Statutes section 177.085 (Supp.
1972) provides that a conveyance of lots abutting streets dedicated in
a plat shall carry the reversionary interest in the abutting street to the
center line unless the owner clearly provides otherwise in the con-
veyance. Thus, if the owner desires to retain the reversionary interest
in the streets, a reservation in the plat alone may not be sufficient. The
statute further provides that anyone holding a reversionary interest in
the abutting streets of lands platted before the effective date of the
statute, other than owners of the abutting lots, must bring suit to
establish their right within one year of the effective date of the statute,
and failure to do so will result in the loss of such reversionary in-
terest.67
D. Easements and Prescriptive Rights
1. IN GENERAL
An easement has been defined as an interest in land in the posses-
sion of another which entitles the owner of such interest to a limited
use or enjoyment of the land in which the interest exists; entitles him
to protection as against third persons from interference in such use or
enjoyment; is not subject to the will of the possessor of the land; is
not a normal incident of the possession of any land possessed by the
owner of the interest; and is capable of creation by conveyance.6" Al-
though the interest must be of a type capable of creation by conveyance,
the actual creation of the interest by conveyance is not essential. Thus,
in addition to creation by express grant, easements may also be created
by prescription or adverse user, or by implication or necessity.69
In Reyes v. Perez°70 the appellate court was faced with a some-
what unique situation. Initially, one Butch owned all the land in ques-
tion, said land bordering on two roads. First, Burch conveyed a parcel
bordering on one of the roadways to Reyes. The Burches then conveyed
an adjoining parcel which lacked road access to Perez. Access to Perez's
property could have been realized either across Reyes' property, a dis-
tance of 235 feet, or across Burch's property, a distance of 570 feet.
The trial court granted an easement across Reyes' property, notwith-
standing the fact that Reyes was not the grantor.
The appellate court refused to accept such an extension of the
66. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-257, creating FLA. STAT. § 177.085.
67. FLA. STAT. § 177.085(2) (Supp. 1972).
68. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944). See generally 1 BOYER, supra note 11,
§ 23.01, at 499.
69. 1 BOYER, supra note 11, § 23.02, at 506.
70. 284 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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principles applicable to an easement by implication. If the land con-
veyed is shut off or entirely surrounded partly by land of the grantor
and partly by that of a stranger, the way of necessity arises over the
adjoining land of the grantor, even though a shorter or better way
may exist over the land of the stranger. Such is consistent with the
principle that the easement arises by implication from the grant; as
to the stranger, there is no such grant from which the easement can
arise.7 '
It is of note that the easement in the instant case was pursuant to
common law, as adopted in Florida Statutes section 704.01(1) (1971),
rather than pursuant to statute as defined in Florida Statute sections
704.01(2) (1971). Although an easement created by statute would
entitle the burdened party to reasonable compensation, an easement
created under the common law invokes no such right.72
An easement may also be created through operation of law by ad-
verse user. 71 Such adverse user may be by a private individual, in which
case the resultant easement would be held by such individual, or the
adverse user may be by the public at large, in which case the easement
would be in favor of the general public. The creation of easements in
favor of the public through adverse use has proved to be an effective
restraint to the private development of Florida's diminishing shoreline
open space areas. An example of such control is found in City of
Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc."4 Desiring to build an observation
tower in connection with a recreational pier which they owned, Tona-
Rama applied to the city for a building permit. After much delibera-
tion, the application was approved and the permit issued. Objection to
the construction and the city's right to grant the permit was brought
by a group of citizens and taxpayers. Before construction was com-
menced, the city brought suit seeking declaratory relief as to the
ownership of the land on which the tower was to be constructed. After
extensive discovery, the trial court determined that for more than
twenty years the general public had used the beach area in question for
sunbathing, picnicking, frolicking, and generally as a recreation area.
Such use was open, notorious, visible, and adverse under an apparent
claim of right and without challenge by anyone purporting to be the
owner of the land. Further, the city had constantly policed the area,
had controlled automobile traffic there, and had otherwise exercised
its police power over the area.
From these facts the trial court found that there had accrued in
favor of the general public a prescriptive right to an easement for
thoroughfares, bathing, recreation, and playground purposes. Due to
71. See R. ThomnsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 362, at 413 (1961).
72. FLA. STAT. § 704.04 (1971).
73. See generally 1 BOYER, supra note 11, § 23.03(4), at 529.
74. 271 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Tona-Rama].
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the existence of such easement, the city therefore had no lawful author-
ity to issue a building permit to authorize construction of the tower.
In affirming the trial court's holding that a prescriptive right to
the soft sand area of the beach could arise in favor of the general public,
the District Court of Appeal, First District, was careful to limit the
extent of its holding. First, the court made clear the fact that its hold-
ing was based exclusively on the common law notions of prescriptive
easements; it was not a broad expropriation of private property without
compensation by judicial fiat, motivated by social policy. Second, the
court noted that not all use of private beaches or shorelines gives rise
to a prescriptive easement. "Neither occasional use by a large number
of bathers nor frequent or even constant use by a smaller number of
bathers gives rise to a prescriptive right in the public to use privately
owned beaches."7 A key element in the determination as to whether a
prescriptive right has arisen is the degree to which facilities of local
government are called into play:
It is only when the use during the prescribed period is so
multitudinous that the facilities of local governmental agen-
cies must be put into play to regulate traffic, keep the peace
and invoke sanitary measures that it can be said that the
public has acquired a prescriptive right to use privately
owned beaches.7"
Although it is clear that the first district in no way intended Tona-
Rama to be a panacea in gaining access to a dwindling shoreline, courts
might show a willingness to resort to this device. In City of Hollywood
v. Zinkil," a question arose as to whether two blocks of unimproved
oceanfront beach property had been dedicated to public use. In re-
manding the case for reconsideration of the issue of dedication, the
court pointed out that the trial court should consider the applicability
of Tona-Rama in the event that the city's claim of dedication should
fail.
2. STANDING TO RAISE PUBLIC PROPERTY RIGHTS
The realization that certain rights can become vested in the public
at large, as in Tona-Rama, affords a powerful tool for the protecti6ii
of public interest. However, the establishment of the right alone is not
sufficient to fully protect that interest-the courts must allow compe-
tent parties to bring suit on behalf of the general public to preserve and
protect those rights.
Traditionally, an action to enforce a public right could be brought
by a private individual only if that individual could show his injury
75. Id. at 770.
76. Id. at 770.
77. 283 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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to be different in degree and kind from that suffered by the community
at large. 8 If no such injury could be shown by any single indivdual,
then enforcement was left to governmental authorities. However, where
the antagonistic party was a governmental body, such a holding effec-
tively precluded the controversy from being heard.
Askew v. Hold the Bulkhead--Save Our Bays, Inc.79 presents an
example of the failure of this traditional approach. A park was donated
to the state specifically for the purpose of public recreation and as a
wildlife sanctuary. The state began construction of various improve-
ments designed to develop camping and restaurant facilities in the
park. Plaintiffs, a private citizen and a non-profit corporation, brought
suit to enjoin the state from going through with construction, alleging
that such activities would substantially destroy the park as a wildlife
sanctuary in breach of the public trust. The trial judge dismissed the
non-profit corporation due to lack of standing.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, not
only affirmed the dismissal of the corporation, but also reversed the
trial court as to the private citizen, holding that said party should also
have been dismissed due to lack of standing. Since neither party had
alleged or shown that one or the other would suffer a special injury or
that either had a special interest in the outcome of the litigation,
neither had standing. Such a result was predicated on the fear that
any other result would present a threat of interminable litigation
against any public official, since no one individual would be bound by
res judicata as a result of prior suits.80 However, at the same time, the
court refused to consider the fact that precluding the present parties
from bringing suit in the instant case insured that there would be no
one to adequately represent the interest of the plaintiffs.
The second district reconsidered the above question, and in Save
Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,8 expressly repudiated the
special injury rule in favor of a broadened concept of standing. A non-
profit citizens' group brought suit to enjoin a steel corporation from
interfering with alleged vested rights of members of the group in a
portion of sand beach. Finding that the plaintiffs had failed to show in
what manner they had been damaged as private citizens differing in
kind from the general public, the trial court held that the plaintiffs had
no standing to sue.
In analyzing the historical development of the "special injury"
concept, the court of appeal realized that an intolerable result had come
about. Initially designed to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the special
injury limitation resulted in many situations where relief, if sought at
78. See, e.g., Town of Flagler Beach v. Green, 83 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1955).
79. 269 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
80. id. at 697.
81. 281 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
REAL PROPERTY
all, had to be sought by a public official. However, a policy of judicial
passivity arose whereby the courts apparently considered as unreview-
able the inaction of public officials in failing to exercise their discretion
in favor of enforcing public rights. Thus, in many situations, relief was
never obtained by the public or anyone else. The necessity for change
was clear:
[I]t is anathema to any true system of justice to proclaim
that a right may be enjoyed by all yet none may protect it.
Accordingly, except in strictly nuisance cases to date, the
obvious recent trend is to open the courts to afford relief to
many more parties . . . than were heretofore entitled thereto
under the "special injury" rule so broadly applied. 2
Rejecting the necessity of special injury, the court then turned to
the formulation of the United States Supreme Court in Sierra Club v.
Morton"8 to ascertain whether Save Sand Key would be a proper party.
Traditionally, the customary criteria for standing are first, the existence
of a bona fide justiciable controversy presented in an adversarial con-
text, and second, that the party whose standing is challenged has such
a personal stake in the outcome thereof so as to ensure that he will
adequately and expeditiously represent the interest he sserts. 4 As to
this second aspect, an organization will be deemed to have a personal
stake in the outcome if all or some of its members have been or will
be directly and personally aggrieved in some manner relating to, and
within the scope of, the interests represented and advanced by the
organization.
It is to be noted that the above analysis of standing does not elimi-
nate all traditional limitations. Not all organizations will be able to
bring suit on behalf of its members. Where the organization merely
represents a special interest of its members in a public problem, or an
assumed position as spokesman or representative of the public, their
interest is not sufficient."8
Having established that Save Sand Key, Inc. met the above re-
quirements as to the interest of its members, the court then considered
whether a cause of action had been stated. The court found that the
facts of the instant case fit within the rationale of City of Daytona
Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc.,8 recognizing vested prescriptive rights of
the public to a portion of the soft sand area, and thus were sufficient
to defeat a motion to dismiss.
82. Id. at 574.
83. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
84. Id. at 731.
85. Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572, 577 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1973).
86. 271 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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3. MINERAL BASEMENTS
In recent years, the Florida legislature has enacted legislation in-
tended to increase the marketability and validation of titles. One such
effort is the Marketable Record Title Act." In 1970, the legislature
attempted to supplement that act, and further increase the market-
ability of titles, by limiting the duration of easements and rights of
entry relating to mining activities.8" Florida Statutes section 704.05(1)
(1971) provided in pertinent part that
the rights of entry, or of an easement, given or reserved in
any conveyance or devise of realty, when given or reserved
for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, or developing,
shall be limited to a twenty (20) year period beginning with
the recording of such conveyance or devise if such rights are
not exercised during this twenty (20) year period.
The statute further provided that after the expiration of the twenty
year period, the owner of such property, burdened by an easement or
right of entry, may bring suit to quiet title, resulting in a decree re-
moving from the title easement rights.8 9
In Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch, Inc.,9 ° the su-
preme court held that this statute could only be applied prospectively,
and could not be used to retrospectively invalidate property interests
which had been created prior to the effective date of the statute. The
court noted that a statute should not be given retrospective effect when
such construction would jeopardize the constitutional validity of the
statute. Since valuable vested property rights would be destroyed by
the retrospective application of the statute, and since the destruction of
those rights is not necessarily expedient to conserve the rights of others
or of the public welfare, the statute would not be construed retrospec-
tively unless such construction was clearly and plainly intended by the
legislature. The court distinguished the retroactive application given to
the Marketable Record Title Act 9 ' in that said act did not absolutely
eliminate vested rights, but provided a savings clause"2 whereby such
rights could be preserved by filing proper notice.
The constitutionality of the statute was again before the supreme
court in Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. Hogue.9" The trial
court had attempted to apply the statute retrospectively and found the
statute to be unconstitutional in such application. The supreme court,
relying upon Tufts College, found that a determination of the constitu-
87. FiA. STAT. ch. 712 (1971).
88. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-100, creating FLA. STAT. § 704.05.
89. FLA. STAT. § 704.05(2) (1971).
90. 275 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Tufts College].
91. See Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 236 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1970).
92. FIA. STAT. § 712.05 (1971).
93. 277 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
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tional question was unnecessary in light of its ruling that the statute
would only be applied prospectively.
The statute was amended in 19730" to reduce the initial duration of
such unexercised rights of entry or easements to a period of ten years,
and also to provide for the preservation of such unexercised rights
beyond the ten year period by the person claiming such right and filing
a notice of such claim in the circuit court of the county where the land
is located. Under the amended statute, such rights of entry or ease-
ments can be preserved indefinitely by refiling a notice every ten
years.95 Such notice can be filed on behalf of persons under a disability
and by members of a class on behalf of another member whose identity
is uncertain.
The amended act specifically states it is intended to operate both
prospectively and retrospectively, 6 and, thus, is intended to overcome
the precise holding of Tufts College. Further, the provision for pre-
serving such rights by re-recording a notice thereof every ten years,
follows the technique of the Marketable Record Title Act,97 and hope-
fully overcomes constitutional objections as to retroactivity. At any
rate, the legislature adopted the suggestion of the supreme court in
Tufts College and provided such technique.
E. Adverse Possession
In the absence of a controlling statute, payment of taxes by an
adverse possessor on the land he claims is not necessary to his perfect-
ing title. 8 In such instances, payment of taxes has only evidentiary
value material to whether the holding was hostile.
Florida, however, requires that an adverse possessor file a return
on any disputed property held without color of title and pay all taxes
presently and previously assessed on that land during each year of his
adverse claim. 9 Thus, as a requisite to claim title through adverse
possession without color of title, the adverse party must file a return and
pay taxes for seven consecutive years. No such requirement with regard
to taxes exists as to title claimed through adverse possession under color
of title.'00 Thus, it is important to determine whether a particular claim
is with or without color of title.
In Meyer v. Law,191 the respondents, relying upon an incorrect
survey, built and maintained a fence for 25 years which enclosed a
94. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-140, amending FLA. STAT. § 704.05 (1971).
95. FLA. STAT. § 704.05(3) (1973), created by Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-140.
96. FLA. STAT. § 704.05(4) (1973), created by Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-140.
97. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
98. Day, The Validation of Erroneously Located Boundaries by Adverse Possession and
Related Doctrines, 10 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 245, 260 (1957).
99. FLA. STAT. § 95.18 (1971).
100. FLA. STAT. 1 95.16 (1971).
101. 287 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1973).
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portion of petitioner's land contiguous to their own. The deeds of both
parties reflected the true boundary. The question before the court was
whether respondents could, through adverse possession, gain title to
the enclosed strip, even though they did not pay taxes for that strip.
On its face, Florida Statutes section 95.17(2) (1971) purports to
deal with this situation. 10 2 The second district 08 interpreted this statute
literally, holding that when a person claims certain specific land under
color of title, such claimant may enclose the properties of contiguous
owners for seven years, without returning or paying taxes, and without
having color of title to the land encroached upon, and thus perfect his
claim to the property of adjoining owners.
The supreme court rejected this interpretation of Florida Statutes
section 95.17(2) (1971):
We believe that, in enacting the foregoing subsection, the
legislature intended to provide that, where one has color of
title to a larger area than is fenced or cultivated, and he pays
no taxes on any of the land described in the title, he may
acquire title by adverse possession only to that portion of the
land shown on the paper title which he actually fences or
cultivates.104
Thus, respondent in the instant case could only claim title to the extent
he made a return on the land or paid taxes. Since he did neither, his
claim was invalid.
Of note is the dissent of Justice Adkins, concurred in by Justice's
Carlton and Ervin.105 He argued that the legislative intent of the
statute, relied upon by the majority, indicates that said statute was an
extension of the definition as to what constitutes color of title. Further,
although the position of the court is in accord with the traditional
definition of color of title, it fails to account for the language of Florida
Statutes section 95.17(2) (1971), and in fact ignores the literal mean-
ing of that language.
It can only be concluded that although the decision of the supreme
court resolved the apparent conflict in the decisions of the district
courts of appeal,10 6 the apparent conflict between the decision and the
statute remains.
102. The statute provides in pertinent part that
[f or the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claiming a
title founded upon a written instrument, . . . land shall be deemed to have been
possessed and occupied ... [w]here it has been protected by a substantial enclosure.
All contiguous land protected by such enclosure shall be deemed to be premises in-
cluded within the written instrument ....
FLA. STAT. § 95.17 (1971) [emphasis added].
103. Meyer v. Law, 265 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
104. Meyer v. Law, 287 So. 2d 37, 40 (Fla. 1973).
105. Id. at 41.
106. E.g., Holley v. May, 75 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1954); Palmer v. Greene, 159 Fla. 174,
31 So. 2d 706 (1947).
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IV. WATER LAW
A. Submerged Lands
Florida courts have generally recognized, in accord with the civil
law view, that when a nonnavigable lake is under private ownership,
owners of property with portions thereof under the lake have a right
to use all of the lake for boating, bathing, and fishing so long as they
do not interfere with the rights of others.10 7 Further, it has been held
that such owners do not have exclusive dominion over the water over-
lying their land.108
Exceptions to the above rule have been made, however, where the
land involved is not strictly a lake, but rather would be classified as
marsh or swamp. Thus, where the land involved is dry part of the
time, a landowner is permitted to maintain dikes, spillways, and dry
wells to control the water flow, and in such situation, other landowners
do not have an absolute right to utilize the waters.
The latter rule was applied in McMullen v. Ramsey Stock Farms,
Inc.,'109 where an action was brought to restrain owners of bottomland
from ditching, diking, and draining portions of the swamp or marsh
area. Rather than finding an absolute right to exist in the other marsh-
land owners, the court applied a "reasonable use" theory. Since the
diking and ditching operations did not substantially impair the other
landowner's use of the portions of the area, said use being primarily
recreational in nature, such operations were reasonable in light of the
attendant circumstances, and would not be enjoined.
B. Accretions
By the great weight of authority, title to accreted lands vests in
the riparian owners of abutting lands."0 Exception is made to this rule
where the riparian himself causes the accretion; in such instance, title
to the accreted land vests in the state."' Since land below the high water
mark is owned by the state, to permit the riparian owner to cause ac-
cretion and gain title to such land would be tantamount to allowing him
to take state land.
In Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Me-
deira Beach Nominee, Inc.,"' a second exception to the above rule was
proposed, i.e., that where accretions are caused by the state, title should
vest in the state rather than in the riparian owner. This rule was re-
jected by the court. Accretions had formed in front of appellee's ri-
107. See 1 BoYER, supra note 11, § 25.03, at 629.
108. Id. § 25.03[21, at 634.
109. 272 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
110. See Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221 (1919).
ll. See, e.g., Brundage v. Knox, 279 Ill. 450, 117 N.E. 123 (1917).
112. 272 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Medeira Beach].
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parian uplands, apparently as a result of an erosion control program of
the state. The trial judge made no findings as to what extent the accre-
tions were the result of natural processes, finding that appellee would
hold title to the accreted lands even if no accretion would have occurred
but for the state project.
On appeal, the court was therefore presented with the question
of whether a strip of accreted land belongs to the adjoining riparian
owner, as opposed to the state, where such accretion was the result of
a lawful exercise of the police power by a governmental unit to pre-
vent beach erosion.
The court noted that the doctrine of accretion, holding that title
to accreted lands vests in the adjoining riparian, is supported by four
reasons:
(1) de minimis non curat lex; (2) he who sustains the burden
of losses and of repairs imposed by the contiguity of waters
ought to receive whatever benefits they may bring by accre-
tion; (3) it is in the interest of the community that all land
have an owner and, for convenience, the riparian is the
chosen one; (4) the necessity of preserving for the riparian
the right of access to the water.113
These four policy reasons clearly indicate that the interest of the ri-
parian in accreted land is superior to that of the state. Florida, there-
fore, followed the majority of states in holding that such land vests in
the riparian owner.
The legislature has arrived at a result opposite to that above.
Florida Statutes section 161.051 (1971) purports to vest title to ac-
cretions caused by public works in the state. In Medeira Beach, the
court noted that this statute would not be applied retroactively, and
since the erosion control projects were begun before the effective date
of the statute, the statute was of no effect. Though the statute would
apparently supercede the ruling of Medeira Beach as to erosion con-
trol projects begun after 1965, its use would appear open to constitu-
tional challenge. The riparian or littoral right to future accretions is
a vested right which is an inherent and essential attribute of the origi-
nal property. 4 By passage of such statute, the state cannot be per-
mitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking of property
without due process of law and just compensation.1 15 Therefore, the
statute could divest riparian owners of their vested right to accretions
only if compensation were made for the taking.
C. Pollution
As part of an ongoing effort to control pollution via statutory
means, the Florida legislature in 1973 enacted procedures whereby
113. Id. at 212-13.
114. County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46 (1874).
115. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 292 (1967) (concurring opinion).
REAL PROPERTY
property owners abutting or constituting the bottom of small inland
lakes of 150 acres or less can obtain relief from water pollution and
shore erosion. 11 The act defines certain activities as constituting a
nuisance, and provides that owners of more than fifty percent of the
land may file a petition with their respective county commissioners. The
chairman of the commissioners shall then notify the state department
of pollution control, the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund,
and the department of natural resources. Such agencies shall then sub-
mit recommendations to the county commissioners, and if the com-
missioners determine that a statutory nuisance exists, they may enact
an ordinance to abate it.
V. MORTGAGES
A. Assumption Agreements
The grantee of mortgaged property who assumes the mortgage
debt becomes personally liable therefor, and as between him and the
grantor, becomes primarily liable. Upon default, therefore, the grantor
can maintain an action against an assuming grantee, and, under the
majority view, such action can be maintained without satisfaction of
the mortgage debt.117
It has been recognized that an action may be maintained under a
theory of subrogation even in the absence of an assumption agreement.
In Fortenberry v. Mandell,"' lessors executed a 99 year lease providing
that improvements made by the lessee would immediately become the
property of the lessors, and providing further that the lessors, without
assuming any personal liability, would join with the lessee in executing
a mortgage. The lessees defaulted on the note accompanying the mort-
gage, and the lessors voluntarily made payment to extinguish the prin-
cipal and interest due on the note. It was held that the lessors suc-
ceeded to the rights of the mortgager through such payment, including
the right to recover judgment on the note. Although the trial court
found for the lessee on the ground that the lessor had not shown the
value of the improvements by the lessee, in order that such might be
set off against the amount of the subrogation claim, the lessor had a legal
right to the improvements by virtue of their lease, and such right was
separate and distinct from their right to enforce the note through
subrogation.
B. Marshalling
One principle generally encompassed within the definition of mar-
shalling is known as the "inverse order of alienation" rule. The rule
116. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-147.
117. See generally 2 BoYER, supra note 11, § 34.12, at 100.
118. 271 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
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requires that when lands are mortgaged to secure a debt, and a part
of said lands are subsequently sold and conveyed by the mortgagor, the
portion unsold is primarily liable under the mortgage." 9 Only if the
debt cannot be satisfied out of the unsold portion can the mortgagee
resort to the alienated portion; said debt must then be applied to the
parcels alienated in the inverse order of their alienation. 2 °
The above principle of marshalling was employed without specific
identification in Palatka Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Raczkow-
ski. 2  In this case a savings and loan association held a mortgage on
fifteen acres of real property owned by R. This property was then sold
by R to T. Subsequently, T sold two acres, containing a house, to de-
fendants, the deed reciting that the conveyance was made subject to the
outstanding mortgage which T, the grantor, agreed to pay from the
purchase price. Later, the mortgagee sought foreclosure against the
entire fifteen acre parcel, including the house and two acres sold to
defendants.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, held that the mort-
gage could be foreclosed against both parcels of land since no challenge
was made to the validity of plaintiff's mortgage, which had been duly
recorded and remained unsatisfied at the time of the above conveyances.
Nevertheless, the court also held that the parcel retained by T must be
sold first and the sale proceeds applied in payment of the mortgage
debt. If the sale of the parcel held by the grantor T should yield a
sufficient amount to discharge the mortgage, then the property pur-
chased by defendants would be free and clear of the mortgage lien.
If not, then defendant's parcel would be sold and so much of the pro-
ceeds as may be necessary should be applied in payment of the balance
of the mortgage indebtedness.' 22
The result is eminently fair and the equities required the applica-
tion of the general inverse alienation rule. First, T knowingly purchased
the whole tract subject to the mortgage, and in all probability, the
amount of the mortgage was taken into consideration in determining
the consideration paid by T to R. Thus, as between T and R, T should
pay or lose the land. Then, when T conveyed a portion to defendants,
T exacted the full purchase price and promised to pay the mortgage
debt. Thus, as between T and the defendants, T should pay the entire
debt. The mortgage, however, is in fact a valid lien on defendant's prop-
erty until the debt is paid. Thus, by requiring the mortgagee to first
go against the land of T, defendants will be protected to the fullest
extent possible. Marshalling should be applied not by rote pursuant to
stated principles, but rather in a judicious manner to accomplish the
purpose of the rules and to achieve the most equitable result.
119. Ellis v. Fairbanks, 38 Fla. 257, 21 So. 107 (1897).
120. G. OsBoRNE, MORTGAGES 580 (2d ed. 1970).
121. 263 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
122. Id. at 845-46.
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C. Foreclosure
The Supreme Court of Florida had indicated by prior decision
that an unsatisfied judgment on a note constituted a bar to a subse-
quent foreclosure action on the security.123 Thus, an action on the note
constituted an election of remedies on the part of the mortgagee. How-
ever, in a growing list of decisions by various district courts of appeal,
this conclusion has been consistently attacked. 124
In Floorcraft Distributors, Inc. v. Horne-Wilson, Inc.,125 the
lender had obtained a final judgment against guarantors on their per-
sonal guaranty of the debt. However, the guarantors had made no pay-
ments on their indebtedness. The court rejected the principle that an
action on the note evidenced an election of remedies and found that
there had been no election of remedies as between an action on the
guaranty and an action on the mortgage and notes covering the same
debt. The underlying rationale that a mortgage lien is not extinguished
until the mortgage debt is actually satisfied supports such a conclusion.
Thus, the lender was not precluded from a subsequent mortgage fore-
closure action, notwithstanding the unsatisfied judgment.
Recognizing the inconsistency between its earlier position and the
latter decisions of the district courts of appeal, the supreme court, in
Junction Bit & Tool Co., v. Village Apartments, Inc.,26 reversed its
earlier position, 27 and held that an unsatisfied judgment stemming from
an action at law on the note does not constitute an election of reme-
dies, and does not bar a subsequent foreclosure action. Further, al-
though section 702.06 of Florida Statutes (1971), relating to deficiency
suits arising out of foreclosures, suggests a contrary result, said statute
has no application to a suit on a note brought independently of any
attempt at foreclosure.
An acceleration clause in a note calling for payment in installments
and/or in a mortgage given as security therefor has been deemed to
confer a contract right upon the mortgagee which he may elect to en-
force upon default.x28 Based on the constitutional necessity of safe-
guarding the validity of contracts and the right of enforcement thereof,
such a contract for acceleration should not be abrogated or impaired
except under exceptional circumstances. Past decisions disclose that
foreclosure on an accelerated basis may be denied where the right to
accelerate has been waived or the mortgagee estopped to assert it, where
the mortgagee failed to perform some duty upon which the exercise of
the right was conditioned, where the mortgagor tenders payment after
default but before notice of the mortgagee's election to accelerate has
123. State ex rel. Teague v. Harrison, 138 Fla. 874, 190 So. 483 (1939).
124. E.g., Klondike, Inc. v. Blair, 211 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968); Lisbon Holding &
Inv. Co. v. Village Apts., Inc., 237 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
125. 251 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
126. 262 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972).
127. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
128. Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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been given, or where payment was not made due to a misunderstanding
or excusable neglect, in part due to some conduct of the mortgagee.' 29
Sufficient grounds for the denial of foreclosure on an accelerated
basis were found in Walsh v. Combs.'" The record indicated that the
second mortgagees filed foreclosure upon failure of the mortgagor to
make the first mortgage payments. However, there was some disagree-
ment as to the mortgage agreement, the mortgagor contending that pay-
ments on the first mortgage were to be made by the second mortgagees
with reimbursement to be made by the mortgagor. Further, there was
no attempt on the part of the second mortgagee to ascertain whether
there was some real possibility that the first mortgagee would initiate
foreclosure, nor was there a bona fide effort on the part of the second
mortgagee to secure the compliance of the mortgagor. Under such cir-
cumstances, the mortgagor could raise the inequity of the accelerated
foreclosure as an affirmative defense to the foreclosure action.
The above situation should be compared with the extended factual
situation of Guynn v. Brentmoore Farms."' In that case, the court could
find no conduct on the part of the mortgagees which resulted in any detri-
ment to the mortgagor, and thus estoppel against accelerated foreclosure
was not invoked.
D. Judicial Sales and Redemption
The right of redemption as applied to the mortgagor is the right
to have the mortgaged property restored free and clear of the mortgage
lien. Under Florida law, the mortgagor remains the owner of the prop-
erty until title is divested as a result of foreclosure. Thus, the "equity
of redemption" exists after default for non-payment, but before issuance
of the deed resulting from the judicial sale. 32
Florida Statutes section 45.031 (1971) establishes a procedure for
judicial sale. Prior to the amendment of said statute in 1971, no mention
was made regarding the right of redemption. Effective January 1, 1972,
an amendment'3 3 provides that in all cases where a person has an
equity of redemption, the court shall not specify a time for redemption,
but the person may redeem the property at any time before the sale.3 ,
In Allstate Mortgage Corp. v. Strasser,85 the question before the
court was whether the above amendment precluded the possibility of
redemption subsequent to the day of sale. In answering the above ques-
tion in the negative, a strict construction was given to the statute, based
129. Id. at 256.
130. 255 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
131. 253 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
132. See generally 2 BOYER, supra note 11, § 32.18, at 1061.
133. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-5, amending FLA. STAT. § 45.031 (1971).
134. FLA. STAT. § 45.031(1) (1971).
135. 277 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Strasser].
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on the fact that it stands in derogation of the common law. As stated
above, the common law rule provides that redemption could be made at
any time prior to entry of the order confirming the sale, unless other-
wise directed by the court. Inasmuch as that portion of the statute per-
taining to time of redemption does not clearly change the common law
right of redemption up until confirmation of the sale, the court con-
cluded that the common law rule must still prevail.
It should be noted that the above decision is at odds with prior
dicta of the third district interpreting the statute. In Akeley v. Miller,"'6
in holding that a junior mortgagee who was not made a party to the
foreclosure proceeding has a right to redeem from the senior mort-
gagee, and that such right of redemption may be freely exercised until
the sale is confirmed by execution and filing of a certificate of title, the
court discussed the amendment to section 45.031 of Florida Statutes
(1971). The court in Akeley felt that this situation would be unlikely
to arise in the future, in that the amendment to the above statute elimi-
nated the ten day period after a sale during which redemption may
occur. The clear conflict in the above two views must therefore be re-
solved. Perhaps the view of Strasser is preferable in that it provides the
mortgagor additional time in which to redeem, without really jeopardiz-
ing the interest of the mortgagee.
Although redemption will result in the restoration of the mort-
gaged property free and clear of the mortgage lien, the property will
still be subject to any general lien which had attached prior to fore-
closure.'87 In Roy v. Matheson,138 the plaintiff had obtained a writ of
execution on a judgment unrelated to the mortgage in question, said
judgment being levied against the mortgaged property. Upon default,
the mortgagee instituted foreclosure proceedings, joining the judgment
lienholder. After sale but prior to confirmation, the mortgagor redeemed
the property. Subsequently, the mortgagee acquired by assignment the
judgment lien, and undertook to sell the property to satisfy the judg-
ment. The mortgagor moved to stay execution, claiming that the judg-
ment of mortgage foreclosure cut off and barred the judgment lien.
Rejecting such contention, the court differentiated general liens,
those which may attach to any property owned by the debtor, from
specific liens, those which are attached to specific property. While the
lien of a specific mortgage is not revived by redemption, the redeemed
property remains subject to a general lien. Such general liens are not
extinguished until title in the mortgagor is divested by the clerk's cer-
tificate of title. 89 In the instant case, since no such certificate was ever
issued due to the redemption, an action to foreclose such general lien
136. 264 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Akeley].
137. Roy v. Matheson, 263 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
138. Id.
139. See FLA. STAT. § 45.031(4) (1971).
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was proper. It is to be noted that such a conclusion is further supported
by Florida Statutes section 702.08 (1971) which provides that when a
foreclosure decree is rescinded, set aside, or vacated, title to the fore-
closed property and the interest of the parties revert to the same status
as existed prior to foreclosure.
As stated above, specific claims against the property will be ex-
tinguished upon issuance of the certificate of title; therefore, it is neces-
sary that any such claim be made prior to that time. In Confederate
Point Partnership, Ltd. v. Schatten,40 a public sale was held whereby
land improved by an apartment complex was sold. Subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title, the purchaser filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment seeking payment from the former owners for
portions of rental payments received by them prior to the issuance of
the certificate of title, and various deposits of the tenants held by them.
The trial court granted a motion to dismiss on the grounds that, inter
alia, the complaint showed on its face that the matters complained of
and sought to be declared and determined were res judicata, the same
having been adjudicated by the foreclosure sale.
Affirming the trial court, the first district held that the purchaser's
claims could have and should have been made only in the action which
gave rise to the sale wherein the purchaser's rights were determined.
Confirmation of a judicial sale has the effect of a final conclusive judg-
ment and cures all irregularities in the making of the sale. Since the
purchasers of property at a judicial sale are regarded as privies to the
judgment authorizing the sale, they are bound by such judgment.
E. Usury
Under certain circumstances, usury may constitute a valid de-
fense to a foreclosure action.
Florida Statutes section 687.071(7) (1971) provides that any debt
created by a transaction involving an extension of credit as defined in
that statute of greater than twenty-five percent per annum is unen-
forceable. If violation of such statute results in forfeiture of the debt,
the mortgage secured thereby necessarily terminates, and hence no
foreclosure can be obtained.
Prior case law has established that a transaction is usurious within
the scope of the above statute if there is a loan, either express or im-
plied, an understanding between the parties that the money lent shall
be returned, that for such a loan a greater rate of interest than is al-
lowed by law shall be paid or agreed to be paid as the case may be, and
there exists a corrupt intent to take more than the legal rate for the use
of the money loaned.' 4'
140. 278 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
141. Stewart v. Nangle, 103 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958).
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Controversy has existed as to the element of intent necessary to
establish usury. In Dixon v. Sharp,142 the supreme court established
that such intent cannot be determined solely from a mathematical
computation of the consequences of the agreement, but must be de-
termined from the entire circumstances surrounding the loan. Sharp
entered into a contract to purchase certain real estate from a real estate
firm in which Dixon was a broker. Lacking necessary funds, Sharp in-
duced Dixon and his wife to lend him $10,000 for sixty days. To pro-
mote such an agreement Sharp offered Dixon a $500 bonus, and later
increased this sum to $700. After an initial refusal, the agreement was
finally consumated. Upon Sharp's failure to repay the $10,000, Dixon
instituted an action for the face value of the note. By way of affirmative
defense, Sharp charged usury and counterclaimed seeking cancellation
of the obligation, both principal and interest.
Initially, the trial court found insufficient evidence that the plain-
tiffs were guilty of willfully and knowingly charging or accepting inter-
est in excess of twenty-five percent. On appeal, the fourth district re-
versed,'143 finding that the trial court had construed the intent element
to require an intent to violate the statute rather than an intent to charge
an amount of interest in excess of that prohibited by the statute. Thus,
it remanded the case for determination as to whether the lenders had
an intent to charge or receive excess interest at the time of execution
of the note.
On remand, the trial court reversed its earlier position and found
in favor of the defendant Sharp, holding that the subject note was unen-
forceable. As stated by the trial court, "the court construes the decision
of the District Court of Appeal in this case to indicate that the requi-
site intent to establish the defense of usury can be determined from a
mathematical computation of the consequences of the agreement en-
tered into between the parties.' 44 This holding was affirmed without
opinion by the district court of appeal. 4 '
On certiorari, the supreme court reversed, finding that the element
of intent is not fully determined by the fact that the lender actually
receives more than the law permits, but is determined by the existence
of a corrupt purpose in the lender's mind to get more than legal in-
terest for the money. It is to be concluded, therefore, that the difference
between a lawful transaction and a usurious one is "the difference be-
tween 'good faith' and 'bad faith'. The parties are permitted to testify
as to their purposes and intentions, and the question of intent is to be
gathered from the circumstances surrounding the entire transaction."4
Thus, the court could not accept the trial court's finding that the requi-
142. 276 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1973).
143. Sharp v. Dixon, 252 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
144. Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817, 819 (Fla. 1973).
145. Dixon v. Sharp, 265 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
146. Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817, 821 (Fla. 1973).
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site intent could be determined solely from mathematical consequences
of the agreement entered into between the parties, and, it reinstated
the original judgment of the trial court.
Both Justice Ervin and Justice Boyd issued strong dissents to the
above opinion. As stated by Justice Boyd,
[t]he majority opinion reaches the unique conclusion that
the usury laws of Florida are directed only against persons
who loan money at an unconscionable rate of interest while
being aware that such conduct is a violation of the law. All
citizens are presumed to know the law. Practically all normal
adults know there are maximum interest rates fixed by law.
Ignorance of the law is no excuse for crime or other mis-
conduct. 47
While a usurious loan will result in forfeiture of the principal and
interest, due to the fact that the debt created is unenforceable,4 8 no
other relief can be provided. Thus, in Morette v. Sussman,'149 a claim
for punitive damages was denied. Since usury is a creature of statute,
usury violations give rise only to those penalties and relief provided
by statute. Other damages, either compensatory or punitive, are not
recognized or permitted.
VI. MECHANICS' LIENS
A. General Operation
When a laborer, materialman, or other person entitled under the
Mechanics' Lien Law50 contributes to the enhancement of real proper-
ty, and the contractor or owner defaults in payment, such person may
obtain a lien under specified conditions. When the contractor fails to
pay, the owner, upon receipt of proper notice, is required to withhold
payment from the contractor, and channel such payment to the lienor.
When the owner fails to pay, a lien is placed against his interest in the
improved property.'' Upon the owner's failure to pay the lien, his
interest in the property may be sold and the proceeds used to satisfy
the liens. 52
Although there is no express provison within the act, it has been
held that a lien may be allowed only when there has been a substantial
performance of the contract on the lienor's part. 5 Substantial per-
formance is generally found if the lienor's omission is not so serious
147. Id. at 823 (dissenting opinion).
148. FLA. STAT. § 687.071(7) (1971).
149. 274 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
150. Fla. Stat. ch. 713 (1971). See generally 2 BOYER, supra note 11, § 33.02, at 1069 as
to the general operation of mechanic's liens.
151. FLA. STAT. § 713.05 (1971).
152. FLA. STAT. §§ 713.26, 713.28 (1971).
153. American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Bell Electric Co., 260 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972)
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that it cannot be remedied by reducing payment on the contract
price. 5 In such situation, the owner will be allowed credit for such
reasonable sum as he had to pay in correcting work included in the
lienor's claim.
An example of the allowance of a credit is found in Berkowitz v.
Anderson & Wallace Construction Co."55 The homeowners were re-
quired to pay a sum of money for the repair of defects and for the
completion of the work after the contractor left the job. The trial
court's failure to consider the amount expended to correct the con-
tractor's work was held to be error; the landowners were entitled to a
set-off, equal in amount to that portion of their expenditure attribut-
able to repair of the contractor's defects.
Circumstances may arise in which the failure of the contractor to
complete performance will not result in a set-off against his lien. In
Reitano v. Peninsular Building Supply Co.,'"0 the contractor had re-
moved the roof of the owner's house pursuant to contract. The house was
left uncovered for over a week, during which time it rained. The owner
thereupon informed the contractor that she would make no further pay-
ments under the contract since her property had been damaged by the
rainstorm while uncovered. The contractor thereafter stopped perfor-
mance. The house was then left in an uncovered condition for several
months. The contractor brought an action to foreclose its mechanic's lien,
and the homeowner counterclaimed, which claim was denied. Although
uncertainty as to the amount of damage will not prevent recovery, un-
certainty as to the cause of the damage will defeat such recovery. In the
instant case there was uncertainty as to the extent of damage attribut-
able to the roofer; in the absence of such evidence, the counterclaim
must be dismissed.
B. Privity
By express provision of the Mechanics' Lien Law, privity is not re-
quired in order to establish a lien. Thus, a materialman who is not in
privity with the owner shall have a lien on the real property improved
for any money that shall be owing to him for labor, services or materials
furnished in accordance with his contract and with the direct contract. 57
It is further provided that if such person shall fail, for any reason, to
establish a lien for the full amount due him, he may recover a judgment
against any party liable for the lien, or against a party from which such
sums are due him under a contract. 58
The interpretation of the above requirements was before the court
154. Id.
155. 260 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
156. 262 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
157. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(1) (1971).
158. FLA. STAT. § 713.28(1) (1971).
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in Logan Construction Co. v. Warren Brothers Construction Co. 5 9 In
an action at law to foreclose a mechanic's lien against a property owner,
the court committed itself to a literal interpretation of the above pro-
visions in holding that an unpaid materialman of a subcontractor cannot
recover a personal judgment against the general contractor in the
absence of privity. Clearly, a money judgment could be authorized
against the owner of the property since the statute expressly provides
for such judgment. °60 However, there is no such provision for a money
judgment against the contractor, for there was no contract or privity be-
tween these two parties. Thus, a statutory predicate exists only for a
lien against the property and any personal judgment against the owner.
Provision is made within the statute for lien resulting from the ren-
dering of personal services. 1 ' An architect, landscape artist, engineer
or land surveyor shall have a lien on real property improved, for money
owed him for his services in preparing plans, specifications or drawings
used in connection with improving real property. 6 2 Where the intended
improvement of the property is not made, then the engineer has a lien
for services rendered only when resulting from a "direct" contract with
the owner, as distinguished from a subcontract. 6 '
In Warshaw v. Pyms,6 4 a letter of agreement was signed by the
architect and an engineer, whereby the engineer agreed to perform speci-
fied services for a fixed sum. The engineer attempted to enforce a lien
against the owner for the value of such services. In reversing the trial
court, it was held that in order for an engineer to have a lien for ser-
vices, it was not necessary that there be a face-to-face personal con-
frontation between the owners and engineer to constitute a "direct" con-
tract. The owners could become obligated through acts of an authorized
agent. Whether the architect was authorized to act for the owners was
a question of fact precluding summary judgment.
C. Lienor's Notice
The statute requires non-privity lienors, other than laborers, to file
a notice to the owner as a prerequisite to the perfection of the lien.6 5
The purpose of said section is to prevent the owner from being surprised
by the assertion of liens from persons not contracting directly with him
and of whom he had no notice.
It is now well established that the notice requirement simply pro-
vid6s for a category of priority lienors who do in fact file such timely
159. 268 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1972).
160. FLA. STAT. § 713.28(1) (1971).
161. FLA. STAT. § 713.03 (1971).
162. FLA. STAT. § 713.03(1) (1971).
163. FLA. STAT. § 713.03(2) (1971).
164. 266 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
165. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(2) (1971).
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notice.166 The failure to give the notice does not preclude recovery on
the part of the lienor. If funds remain available after all lienholders fil-
ing timely notice have been discharged, then the tardy lienholder can
also receive payment.'6 7 However, where all funds due to the prime con-
tractor have been paid out, as in W. W. Gay Mechanical Contractors,
Inc. v. B. J. Case,68 a subcontractor failing to give timely notice will
not be entitled to a lien. Since the owner was not put on notice, he will
not be required to pay for services for which the prime contractor has
already received payment.
D. Perfection of Liens
The procedures established for the perfection of liens by claimants
is designed to afford protection to the owner. One such procedure re-
quires the contractor to give the owner, at the time of final payment, a
statement under oath to the effect that all lienors have been paid in full,
or in the alternative the name of each lienor who has not been paid in
full and the amount due.'69 Failure to provide this statement prevents
the contractor from perfecting a lien or having a right of action against
the owner. 7 °
In Stenholm v. Calbeck,' the court considered the time period in
which such affidavit must be filed. A claim of lien must be filed within
ninety days after completion of labor or services.'72 The affidavit, on
the other hand, must be filed at least five days before instituting suit." 8
The trial court had dismissed an action by the contractor to foreclose
his lien on the grounds that the affidavit was filed more than ninety
days after the last items of service and materials were furnished. This
was held to be error in that only the claim of lien, not the affidavit, must
be filed within that period. Thus, if the claim of lien was timely filed,
and the affidavit was filed five days prior to the commencement of the
action, the action could be maintained, notwithstanding the fact that
the affidavit was filed subsequent to the ninety day period.
The affidavit procedure protects the owner against the possibility
of a lien for the same labor or services filed by both a contractor and
subcontractor. It affords no protection against a lien solely of a subcon-
tractor or of a materialman supplying the subcontractor. Thus, in Foun-
tainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Lowry Electric Co., 7 4 it was held that a sub-
166. Crane Co. v. Fine, 221 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1969).
167. See Moretrench Corp. v. Bronson & Veal Enterprises, 262 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1972); Midway Shipping Mall, Inc. v. Corky Corp., 257 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
168. 275 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
169. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d)(1) (1971).
170. Id.
171. 265 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
172. FLA. STAT. § 713.08(5) (1971).
173. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3) (d) (1) (1971).
174. 269 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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contractor was not required to furnish an affidavit stating that all lienors
had been paid in full as a condition of recovery in an action to fore-
close his mechanic's lien.
In addition to the affidavit procedure, it is provided that in order
to perfect his lien, every lienor, including laborers and persons in privity,
must record a claim of lien.'75 The statute details those items which
must be included in the claim of lien. It also provides that the omission
of any of the prescribed details shall not, within the discretion of the
trial court, prevent the enforcement of the lien as against one who has
not been adversely affected to a substantial extent.176
The extent of this discretion was considered in Adobe Brick &
Supply Co. v. Centex-Winston Corp.17 As a result of the fact that the
claim of lien did not contain a correct legal description of the property
as required by statute, the trial court granted a motion for judgment
at the close of the plaintff's case in an action for foreclosure. Since the
defendant had not presented his case, there was no showing that he had
been adversely affected by the misdescription, and thus the trial court
had erred in granting the motion. Although the enforcement of the lien
is within the discretion of the court, such discretion should not be exer-
cised to deny enforcement unless it appears from a preponderance of
the evidence that the owner was adversely affected by the error.
E. Enforcement of Liens
A lien is enforced by bringing an action to subject the real property
to the lien and to have it sold to satisfy the claim. Prior to such action,
however, the owner or any interested party may bring suit to have the
lienor show cause why his lien should not be either enforced by action or
cancelled of record. 7 ' It has been held that when subjected to such
suit, the lienor may file a counterclaim to foreclose along with his an-
swer, instead of filing a separate suit to foreclose. 17 9
The statute of limitations for bringing an action to enforce a me-
chanic's lien is one year.8 0 The owner may, however, shorten the time
for commencement of the action to sixty days by recording a notice of
contest of lien.'"' Notwithstanding a strong dissent, the supreme court
held that the filing of an amended claim of lien does not toll the run-
ning of the sixty day period.8 2
Although the right to a lien may be waived expressly or by impli-
175. FLA. STAT. § 713.08 (1971).
176. FLA. STAT. § 713.08(4)(a) (1971).
177. 270 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
178. FLA. STAT. § 713.21(4) (1971).
179. Wesley Const. Co. v. Yarnell, 268 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
180. FLA. STAT. § 713.22(1) (1971).
181. FLA. STAT. § 713.22(2) (1971).
182. Jack Stilson & Co. v. Caloosa Bayview Corp., 278 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1973).
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cation, it has been held that a provision in the contract for arbitration
of controversies does not in itself constitute a waiver of the contractor's
rights to judicial enforcement of his mechanic's lien for amounts found
due under the contract.' 83 Thus, although the contractor may be re-
quired to arbitrate the issue of its entitlement to final payment and the
amount thereof because of the arbitration agreement, he nevertheless
retains the right to enforce the amount ultimately determined to be due
by means of a mechanic's lien.
F. Attorney's Fees
Florida Statutes section 713.29 (1971) provides that in any action
brought to enforce a mechanic's lien, the prevailing party shall be en-
titled to recover a reasonable fee for services rendered by his attorney,
which fee shall be taxed as part of the costs. Considerable litigation
has involved the interpretation as to who is the "prevailing party" under
varied factual circumstances.
It is clear that one successfully resisting the assertion of a me-
chanic's lien will be considered the prevailing party, and thus entitled
to attorney's fees. In Dominguez v. Benach, T'8 the plaintiff brought an
action on an architect's contract and the defendant filed a counterclaim
which attempted to assert a mechanic's lien. The final judgment dis-
missed both the complaint and counterclaim. Since the plaintiff had suc-
cessfully resisted the claim for a mechanic's lien as asserted by the
counterclaim, he was the prevailing party and, therefore, the failure to
award him attorney's fees was improper.
In Houdaille-Duval-Wright Co. v. Charldon Construction Co.,'85 the
subcontractor brought an action to foreclose his mechanic's lien against
the owner, and joined the contractor as a defendant. In his answer, the
defendant contractor counterclaimed alleging delay in delivery of the ma-
terials and claiming damages therefor. It was found at trial that the
amount owed the defendant contractor was greater than the amount
of the lien; thus, there was a net judgment in favor of the contractor.
Pursuant to such judgment, the court awarded attorney's fees to the
contractor, as well as to the defendant owner.
Though the award of attorney's fees to the defendant owner was
proper, since the subcontractor failed to prove a basis for the enforce-
ment of the lien with the result that the owner was the prevailing party
in the lien foreclosure action, the award of attorney's fees to the con-
tractor was error. The contractor was a prevailing party on a collateral
issue between the subcontractor and the contractor, but it was not a pre-
vailing party in the cause of action presented to enforce the lien, as re-
183. Mills v. Gottfried, Inc., 272 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
184. 277 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
185. 266 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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quired by statute."" Such cause of action was solely against the owner,
not against the contractor, therefore, the owner was the only party who
could properly recover attorney's fees.
When judgment is entered in favor of the lienor, he will be con-
sidered the prevailing party, regardless of the fact that the amount
awarded is less than the amount claimed to be due. In Foxbilt Electric
Inc. v. Belefant,"8' a materialman brought suit to foreclose his lien, and
the owners counterclaimed for damages based on their dissatisfaction
with the work done by the materialman. Final judgment in the trial
court was entered for the materialman after deducting certain amounts
established by the counterclaim, but the award of attorney's fees was in
favor of the owner. Such award was held to be error by the court of
appeal, in light of the fact that the materialman would be considered the
prevailing party under the statute, and therefore entitled to such fees.
The above case also established that attorney's fees should be
awarded for the successful prosecution of an appeal. Since the section
providing for the award of attorney's fees is primarily designed to pre-
clude any diminution of the claimant's full compensation for which he is
suing while, at the same time, discouraging specious claims or defenses,
the purpose of the provision can only be met by awarding fees for ser-
vices rendered on appeal.188
To meet the intent of the provision awarding attorney's fees, it has
been held that such fees should only be awarded at the conclusion of the
action. In Midway Shopping Mall, Inc. v. Airtech Conditioning, Inc.,"8 9
the trial court had dismissed one count of a complaint for foreclosure of
a mechanic's lien by releasing the land and transferring the lien asserted
to the fund created by the construction bond, and released the lis pen-
dens which had been filed. Such action did not constitute the landowner
as the "prevailing party" within the provision of the statute, for it did
not adjudicate all claims. Thus, there was no favorable determination
of such finality as would entitle the owner to attorney's fees under the
statute.
VII. TAXES and TAX LIENS
A. Valuation
The Florida constitution provides that all land is to be assessed at
a just valuation, according to such regulations as are prescribed by gen-
eral law.' ° In arriving at such just valuation, the legislature has pro-
vided that the tax assessor shall consider the following factors: the pres-
186. FLA. STAT. § 713.29 (1971).
187. 280 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
188. Id.
189. 253 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
190. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
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ent cash value of the property, the highest and best use to which the
property can be expected to be put in the immediate future, the present
use of the property, the location of the property, the size of the parcel,
the cost of the property, the condition of the property, the income re-
ceived from the property, and the net proceeds from the sale of the
property. 1'' The implementation of these factors has led to much con-
troversy, the interest of the landowner competing with those of the gen-
eral public as vocalized by the tax assessor.
One common device employed by those holding land for specula-
tion is to arrange for such lands to be used for agricultural purposes, and
thus, hopefully realizing the benefit of a decreased rate of tax on such
property. In Chapman v. Cassady,19' the court in effect validated the
above procedure, holding that an owner of agricultural property is en-
titled to the protection of an agricultural assessment even though he
places or causes to be placed "for sale" signs on the property, and offers
to sell the land for commercial purposes. As long as the actual use is for
a bona fide agricultural purpose, any speculative intent of the landowner
is of no consequence.
A similar result is found in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Walden,'
where the land was used as a cattle ranch, and the owner's intention to
mine the land had not been carried out. The fact that the land was ac-
quired with the thought of mining it does not negate the bona fides of an
agricultural use any more than does the anticipation of speculative
profits.
It is not to be implied from the above that any agricultural opera-
tion on the land is sufficient to qualify that land for an agricultural as-
sessment. In Greenwood v. Oates,' the trial court had found that cer-
tain lands were not agricultural lands for tax purposes. Reversing the
district court of appeal,'95 the supreme court found there was sufficient
evidence to support the trial court's finding that the land was not used
for a bona fide forestry operation entitled to agricultural treatment. Such
evidence included the fact that the tract contained large stands of un-
merchantible timber, that improvements had not been made for forestry
purposes, and that there had been no forestry management operations.
This result was predicated on a consideration of two statutes. Flor-
ida Statutes section 193.071(3) (1971) provides that all lands being
used for agricultural purposes shall be assessed as agricultural lands
upon an acreage basis, and that such agricultural purposes shall include
only lands being used in bona fide farming, pasture, grove or forestry
operations. To supplement this statute, Florida Statutes section 193.-
461(3) (1971) provides that all lands which are used primarily for
191. FLA. STAT. § 193.011 (1971).
192. 278 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
193. 277 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
194. 251 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Oates].
195. Oates v. Bailey, 241 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
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bona fide agricultural purposes shall be zoned agricultural, and Florida
Statutes section 193.461(5) (1971) provides that agricultural lands
shall include among other things forestry operations.
In arriving at its conclusion, the court established that the existence
of a "bona fide forestry operation" is not to be tested by the subjective
intention of the operator, but rather is to be ascertained objectively on
the basis of all available characteristics of the situation. Such objective
considerations include the opinions of forestry or other appropriate ex-
perts, the tax assessor's expert opinion, the business or occupation of the
landowner, the nature of the terrain, the density of the marketable tim-
ber, the past usage of the land, the economic merchantibility of the agri-
cultural product, the reasonably attainable economic salability of the
product within a reasonable future time, and the use or not of recognized
care, cultivation, harvesting, and like practices.196
Further, the court stated that although a claim for agricultural as-
sessment might be "bona fide," it might not meet any standards suffi-
cient to qualify it as an operation. However, once the qualities of a
forestry operation are met, it would be a rare case in which the claim
would not be bona fide. Incidental objectives such as increases in land
values would not disqualify the land for such consideration. It is clear
that negative factors are also of no concern-the fact that the land is
not being put to its best use, or that the landowner is not making a profit
does not demand that an agricultural assessment be denied.
In Oates, the court realized that past usage of the land is one factor
to be considered in determining whether an agricultural assessment is
proper. Thus, in Greenwood v. Firstamerica Development Corp.,197 it
was held that since the tax assessor could consider the condition of the
land and the bona fide use to which it was put both in the tax year im-
mediately preceeding as well as the tax year in question, he was entitled
to have the taxpayer produce all pertinent documents relating to the
land for those years.
Traditionally, the purpose of the special agricultural assessment is
to protect a segment of the economy from high tax rates which it cannot
afford. However, the use of the special assessment can also be an effec-
tive planning device. This latter fact is especially true in light of Florida
Statutes section 193.461 (1971), which provides, inter alia, that the
county agricultural zoning board can reclassify lands previously classi-
fied agricultural as nonagricultural when there is contiguous urban or
metropolitan development on two or more sides of the parcel in question,
and when the board finds that the continued use of such lands for agri-
cultural purposes will act as a deterrent to the timely and orderly expan-
sion of the community.
196. Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So. 2d 665, 668 (Fla. 1971).
197. 265 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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In Rainey v. Nelson,98 the constitutionality vel non of the above
statute was before the supreme court as a result of a finding of uncon-
stitutionality on the part of the trial court. Upholding the constitution-
ality of the statute, the court first dismissed any claim of violation of due
process. Since there is no right to special tax treatment in the first in-
stance, the denial of such special treatment can involve no deprivation
of a property right, and hence no denial of due process. The possible
denial of equal protection raises a more serious question, and this neces-
sarily depends on whether the legislative classification is reasonably ex-
pedient for the protection of the public health, safety, welfare or morals.
The court broadly defined such police power as a power which
embraces its whole system of internal regulation, by which the
State seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent
offenses against the State, but also to establish for the inter-
course of citizen with citizen those rules of good manners and
good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict
of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment
of his own so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoy-
ment of rights by others. 9
Under this broad definition, the statute was found to be a valid exercise
of the police power by the legislature. The court further rejected the
notion that the application of the statute was in effect a forced sale and
thus a taking, for an owner's relative worth and thus his ability to pay
the tax would not invalidate an otherwise valid tax.
The use of the above statute is clearly dependent upon a finding
by the Agricultural Zoning Board that the continued use of the land in
question for agricultural purposes will act as a deterrent to the timely
and orderly expansion of the community. Though no guidelines are
given as to how such determination is to be made, the court nevertheless
held that the statute was not vague or uncertain. Further, the court did
not consider the extent to which such a finding will be open to judicial
review. Therefore, it remains for future decisions to determine whether
the statute can be effectively employed to control the growth of the ur-
ban fringe.
As illustrated by the above decisions, the role of the appellate court
is limited in reviewing a judicial determination as to whether an agri-
cultural assessment is warranted. Since a judgment, order, decree or
ruling of a trial court comes to the appellate court with a presumption
of correctness, it is not the function of an appellate court to substitute
its judgment for that of the trier of fact. Although the appellate court
might have reached a different conclusion if it had been the initial ar-
biter, if a review of the record reflects competent substantial evidence
198. 257 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1972).
199. Id. at 539, citing T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 1223 (8th ed. 1927).
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supporting a determination that certain lands were not entitled to an
agricultural assessment, that judgment should be affirmed.2 00
The right to challenge the assessment as entered on the tax rolls is
not an unlimited one, for it is provided by statute that any suit to chal-
lenge the assessment must be brought within sixty days after the assess-
ment roll is certified.20 ' However, under certain circumstances, an as-
sessment may be challenged even after the termination of the sixty day
period. In Lake Worth Towers, Inc. v. Gerstung,20 2 the Supreme Court
of Florida differentiated a voidable assessment, one which is made in
good faith but is irregular or unfair,0 from a void assessment, one not
authorized by law, where the property is not subject to the tax assessed,
or where the tax roll is illegal due to some affirmative wrongdoing by
the taxing official.204 While a voidable assessment cannot be challenged
after the statute of limitations has run, the running of the statute of
limitations will not bar a challenge to an assessment which is unauthor-
ized and void. In the instant case, the value of improvements had been
included in the assessment, even though such improvements were not
substantially completed on January 1 of that year. Since Florida Statutes
section 192.042 (1971) provides that all land on which improvements
are being made shall be assessed as unimproved land if on January 1
such improvements are not substantially completed, the assessment in
question was without statutory authority and void, and, therefore, could
be challenged subsequent to the sixty day period.
In order to secure a just valuation for ad valorem tax purposes
and to provide for a uniform assessment as between property within
each county and property in every other county, the legislature has en-
acted comprehensive legislation for property assessment administra-
tion.2 °5 The principle features include standards of classification to be
used based upon the use of the property,206 an information exchange be-
tween the department of revenue, the assessors' office and the auditor
general,20 7 provisions for the auditing of assessment rolls of each county
by the department of revenue and the auditor general,20 8 and a review
commission which shall have adjudicatory authority to hear complaints
relating to the approval or disapproval of assessment rolls. 9
200. Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 278 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
201. FLA. STAT. § 194.151 (1971).
202. 262 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
203. See Hackney v. McKenny, 113 Fla. 176, 151 So. 524 (1933).
204. See C.D. Utility Corp. v. Maxwell, 189 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
205. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-172.
206. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-172, creating FLA. STAT. § 195.072.
207. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-172, creating FLA. STAT. § 195.084.
208. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-172, creating FLA. STAT. § 195.096.
209. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-172, creating FLA. STAT. § 195.098.
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B. Exemptions From Taxation
In Dade County v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,2 10 the Su-
preme Court of Florida held that where an airline served a public pur-
pose which justified leases of public property to the airline, where there
was use of public financing through the issuance of revenue bonds for
facilities used by the airline, and where the property was leased and used
for the public purpose of transportation and necessary supporting activi-
ties such as an air terminal, the requirement of a public purpose was
met and all leasehold interests held by the airline in such property were
exempt from ad valorem taxation.
It is first to be noted that the above conclusion may have a limited
viability for the future. Article VII, section 10(c) of the Florida con-
stitution, effective January 7, 1969, provides in pertinent part that when
any project financed through the issuance of any county or municipal
bonds is occupied by a private corporation pursuant to a lease or con-
tract, the property interest created by such lease or contract shall be
subject to taxation to the same extent as other privately owned property.
Although the court held that the above provision would not apply in the
instant case, in that the leases in question were created prior to the ef-
fective date, zn it would seem to be applicable to such a case arising in
the future. Further, the court's assumption that the above provision is
not self-executing is open to challenge.212
The court arrived at its conclusion only after a series of strained
interpretations of constitutional provisions. Article VII, section 3(a) of
the Florida Constitution provides that all property owned by a munici-
pality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes shall
be exempt from taxation. Under the old constitution, article XVI, sec-
tion 16 provided in part that the property of corporations shall not be
subject to taxation if used exclusively for municipal purposes. Although
it is clear that the property in question is used in part for a public pur-
pose, the court argued that it is used exclusively for such purpose, in
that the term "public purpose" is a legal concept which includes inci-
dental private purposes, such as the profit motive of the private corpora-
tion. Such reasoning is at best strained, and renders meaningless the
term "exclusive" as used in the above provisions. The difficulties in-
herent in the majority opinion are criticized by Justice Ervin in his
dissent:
There is much confusion in the majority holding and a sub
silentio departure from taxation precedents which will give
trouble. The Court seems to be saying that because a public
210. 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973).
211. Id. at 508-09.
212. Id. at 513 (dissenting opinion of Justice Ervin).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
airport qualified for public bond financing and serves a pre-
dominantly public transportation purpose, it follows that the
private airline leaseholds on the airport properties essential to
commercial aviation likewise serve a public purpose and there-
fore are exempt from taxes. This is indeed a far-reaching,
court-generated tax exemption discriminatory to other tax-
payers without benefit of specific statutory or constitutional
authority.218
An easier case of exemption from taxation is presented by Tre-O-
Ripe Groves, Inc. v. Mills, 214 where the taxpayer leased land from an
agency of the federal government for use in growing citrus fruit. Affirm-
ing the imposition of ad valorem personal property taxes, the court made
clear that the determinative factor for tax liability is not the character
or nature of the property's owner, but the use made of the property.
Since the purposes for which the groves were utilized were essentially
private to the taxpayer, no exemption from taxation could be found.
C. Tax Deeds and Sales
It is provided by statute that at the sale of a tax deed, if the prop-
erty is purchased for an amount in excess of the statutory bid of the
certificate holder, the excess shall be used to discharge any tax liens of
equal dignity of an appropriate municipality or other taxing district.21
If the amount is not sufficient to pay such liens in full, they shall be
paid pro rata and the units shall retain liens on the property for the re-
maining unpaid amount.2 16
In Pinellas County v. S & A Land Co.,21 7 the property in question
was acquired under a tax deed providing that the property would con-
tinue to be subject and liable for any unpaid general taxes of equal dig-
nity with county taxes. Prior to the sale, the county had filed a lien
against the property for unpaid intangible personal property taxes pur-
suant to statute.218 The purchaser brought suit to quiet title, claiming
that any rights represented by the tax lien had been extinguished by the
tax deed. Therefore, the court was faced with a question of first im-
pression as to whether intangible personal property taxes are of equal
dignity with county taxes assessed against real property.
Florida Statutes section 197.011 (1971) provides in part that all
taxes imposed pursuant to the laws of the state shall be a first lien, su-
perior to all other liens on any property against which such taxes have
been assessed. This should be compared to Florida Statutes section
213. Id. at 518.
214. 266 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
215. FLA. STAT. § 197.535(2) (1971).
216. Id.
217. 271 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
218. FLA. STAT. § 199.251 (1971).
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199.241 (1971) which provides in part that all intangible personal prop-
erty taxes shall constitute a lien on all real and personal property owned
by the taxpayer, and shall be superior to all other liens except liens for
other taxes, and prior recorded liens on real estate.
It is thus clear that intangible personal property taxes are not as-
sessed against real property. Thus, the lien for taxes assessed against
real property is superior to intangible personal property tax liens, based
on the clear language of the above statutes, and the latter lien is there-
fore extinguished by the tax sale.219
VIII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. Legislation
The 1973 session of the Florida legislature has produced landmark
legislation affecting two of the most prevelant types of residential dwell-
ings-rental apartments and mobile homes. 220 The Florida act is not a
complete codification of the landlord-tenant relationship in residential
settings, but it does prescribe some principal features of the relationship
and attempts to compensate for imbalances in the relative bargaining
power of the parties. The specific provisions of this legislation are dis-
cussed at length elsewhere.22'
B. Covenants
The landlord, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, is
under no obligation to repair or maintain the premises under the con-
trol of the tenant during the term of the tenancy. However, a covenant
to repair or improve the property is enforceable as any other contract.22
In addition to being a term of the contract, a covenant might also be
construed as a condition precedent to the existence of the lease itself.
An example of the latter situation is found in Meiselman v. Sem-
inole Drug Corp . 2 3 Due to the lessor's failure to complete the building
on time, the lessee entered into an agreement whereby he would accept
the building subject to certain deficiencies being corrected at least 30
days prior to the opening date. These repairs were never completed on
time. Upon the tenant's failure to pay rent due, the landlord instituted
an action to recover such delinquent rents. Affirming the trial court judg-
ment in favor of the tenant, it was held that the lease never came into
being as a binding contract. The subsequent agreement entered into be-
tween the parties was conditioned upon certain repairs on the part of
219. Pinellas County v. S & A Land Co., 271 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
220. Fa. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, creating FLA. STAT. §§ 83.40 et seq.
221. A full discussion of the act is found in Comment, Up From Feudalism-Florida's
New Residential Leasing Act, 28 U. MiAmI L. REV. (to be published).
222. See generally 2 BOYER, supra note 11, § 35.10, at 1269.
223. 260 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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the landlord. Since these were never accomplished, the terms of the
agreement never became effective, and thus the provisions of the lease
which required that the tenant give notice of defects before he could
cancel the lease were never operative.
In University Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Stewart,2 4 the Su-
preme Court of Florida was faced with the interpretation of a lease pro-
vision whereby the tenant agreed to indemnify the landlord against any
and all claims arising in and about the demised premises. Following in-
stitution of suit against the landlord for wrongful death which occurred
when a gas line beneath the leased barbershop exploded, the landlord
filed a third party complaint against the tenant and his insurer for in-
demnity. Finding that the above lease provision would not apply, it was
held that such a contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify
the indemnitee against losses resulting solely from his own negligent acts
unless such intention is expressed in clear and unequivocal language. In
the instant case, the use of the general terms "indemnify... against any
and all claims" did not disclose any clear intent to that effect. Since there
was no indication of negligence on the part of the tenant, the claim of
indemnity against him could therefore not be sustained
C. Options
In State ex rel. Metropolitan Dade County v. Askew,225 the supreme
court had before it the status of the Aerojet tract located on the border
of the Everglades. In 1961, Aerojet-General Corp. entered into a ten
year lease with the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund and the
Board of Education of the State of Florida. The agreement gave Aerojet
an option to purchase at any time during the ten year period. In 1969,
Aerojet attempted to exercise its option, but the lessors refused to con-
vey. Aerojet thereupon sued for specific performance in federal court,
where it was determined that Aerojet had performed all conditions prece-
dent to the exercise of its option.2 6 Specific performance was therefore
ordered. In the instant case, Metropolitan Dade County petitioned for
a writ of mandamus, alleging that it has a right of first refusal to the
disputed tract, as conferred by statute.2 7
Although the statutory provision was enacted subsequent to the
lease agreement, the court held that the statute was still applica-
ble, due to the fact that the lease agreement was expressly made sub-
224. 272 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1973).
225. 267 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1972).
226. Aerojet General Corp. v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1971), apirming 318 F.
Supp. 55 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
227. FLA. STAT. § 253.11 (1971), providing in pertinent part that "[tihe board of trustees
of the internal improvement fund of the state shall not sell or convey any land to which they
hold title unless and until they shall afford an opportunity to the county in which such land
is situated to receive such land for public purposes ......
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ject to applicable statutory rights and reservations in effect on the
date of conveyance. Florida Statutes section 253.11 (1971) must
therefore be complied with before the parties may complete their trans-
action, and thus the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
Fund must first offer the land to Dade County before the land can be
conveyed to Aerojet.
D. Rent
After making a determination that an inflationary spiral and a hous-
ing shortage existed in the city which required the control and regula-
tion of rents, the City Council of Miami Beach enacted a rent control
ordinance.228 The constitutionality vel non of said ordinance was before
the Supreme Court of Florida in City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood
Hotel, Inc. 229
The basic issue for determination by the court was whether the city
had the power in the first instance to enact the ordinance. In answering
this question in the negative, several factors had to be considered. First,
the city charter does not give to the city the explicit power to enact a
rent control ordinance, but only the power to adopt all ordinances neces-
sary or expedient for promoting or maintaining the general welfare, com-
fort, morals, peace, education, etc., and to exercise all of the powers and
privileges conferred upon cities and towns by the laws of the state.2 11
Since a city cannot enact a rent control ordinance either incident to its
specific municipal powers or under its general welfare provisions without
specific authorization from the state,23' whether such authorization
existed must therefore be considered. Although the home rule provi-
sions232 have given local government broad powers, such governments
have not been made omnipotent; there are certain affairs which are ex-
clusively those of the states and are not properly subjects for local regu-
lation. Thus the court discussed at length the fact that the landlord-
tenant relationship has always been considered a matter of state, rather
than local, concern. Therefore, no authority for the enactment of a rent
control ordinance will be found under the home rule provisions.
Despite its determination that the ordinance was invalid for lack
of specific authorization, the court went on to consider the other issues
involved. In addition to lack of authorization, the court found the ordi-
nance to be invalid in that it involved an unlawful delegation of legisla-
tive authority by the city council without appropriate guidelines,233 and
228. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 1791, October 15, 1969.
229. 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972). See generally Note, Rent Control By Municipal Ordi-
nance-Not Within Home Rule Power, 27 U. MIAmi L. REv. (1973).
230. MIAMI BEACH CHARTER, § 6(x).
231. See Warren v. City of Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 362, 127 A.2d 703 (1956).
232. FLA. STAT. § 167.005 (1971), repealed by Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-129.
233. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 1791, October 15, 1969, §§ 16A.2, A.4.
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also in that it conflicts with certain material provisions of state stat-
utes.2 3
4
It is to be noted that the home rule provisions have been amended
subsequent to the instant case, 2 5 and a new rent control ordinance
enacted pusuant thereto."' It is to be questioned, however, whether the
constitutional objections raised by the court can be met by a statutory
amendment in the absence of constitutional authorization.
IX. ZONING
A. Procedure
The authority of a municipality to enact zoning and similar regu-
lations may be conferred either by implication from the grant of express
powers, by special acts of the legislature, including but not limited to
the act incorporating the municipality, or a general act of the legisla-
ture.2"7 One requirement contained in the general act of the legislature
demands that any zoning regulation be made in accordance with a com-
prehensive plan, with such plan designed to meet certain enumerated
public objectives."' Although the procedure whereby such comprehen-
sive plan is developed is left to each municipality, nevertheless, certain
limitations apply as to the type of procedure which may be employed.
In IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach,239 the town had
entered into a contract with a land planning firm for the purpose of
preparing and submitting to the town council a comprehensive plan. The
contract provided that said planner would meet and work with either a
planning commission or the town council during the preparation of the
plan. Subsequently, a Citizen's Planning Committee was appointed to
work with the planners in such capacity. During the course of this work,
the above committee met with the planners at various times in an advis-
ory capacity. Upon completion of the plan, it was submitted to the town
council for approval.
Although the plan was approved by the council, it was challenged in
the instant case on the grounds that the meetings between the citizen's
committee and the town council violated the Government in the Sun-
shine Law240 in that the committee never gave any notice of its meetings
with the planner, nor were the meetings open to the public, nor were
minutes taken. Asserting its reluctance to engraft exceptions on the ap-
plication of the Sunshine Law, the court upheld the above contention.
The court reasoned that if the town council had met with the planner,
234. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.03, .04, .06, .20 (1971).
235. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-129, creating FLA. STAT. § 166.031.
236. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 1978, December 31, 1973.
237. See generally 2 BOYER, supra note 11, § 38.05, at 1409.
238. FLA. STAT. § 176.04 (1971).
239. 279 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
240. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1971).
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such meetings would clearly have fallen within the purview of the law.
Since public officials cannot do indirectly what they are prevented from
doing directly, such officials cannot delegate de facto authority to act on
their behalf in the formulation, preparation and promulgation of plans
on which foreseeable action will be taken by such public officials with-
out the appointed individuals falling within the scope of the Sunshine
Law. As stated by the court,
[i]t would be ludicrous to invalidate the actions of a public
body which are the result of secret meetings of that body or
members thereof while at the same time giving approval to
actions which result from the secret meetings of committees
designated by such public body."'
B. Factors Affecting Validity
It is clear that any zoning regulation limits the rights and privileges
of the owner. However, the deprivation of such privileges and rights
need not be compensated as long as the restriction is deemed a proper
exercise of the police power. Zoning regulations have been held confisca-
tory, and thus not a proper exercise of the police power, when the re-
striction imposed is too burdensome in that it completely deprives the
owner of the beneficial use of his property by precluding the only use
to which it is reasonably adopted.242
An extreme example of unreasonable zoning is found in New Prod-
ucts Corp. v. City of North Miami.24 The land in question was pur-
chased from the city under a contract which provided that it would be
rezoned from public park use to multiple family dwellings. Although the
agreement to sell was upheld, the provision obligating the city to rezone
was not.244 Subsequently, the land was purchased nevertheless, and the
landowner applied for the rezoning of same to multiple family dwellings.
The application was denied. Suit was filed, the landowner claiming that
the present zoning (public park) was unconstitutional, arbitrary and
unreasonable. The claim was upheld on the basis that land zoned for
public park use and owned by a private party presents an untenable
position in that it completely deprives the owner of any beneficial use
of his property by precluding all possible uses. Although the trial court
had ordered the city to either rezone the property, acquire it by eminent
domain, or remove it from the tax rolls, such order was found to be error
in that eminent domain was not the subject of the instant cause, and
that removing the property from the tax rolls would not remedy the
confiscatory nature of the present zoning classification.
241. IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1973).
242. Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So. 2d 642 (1941).
243. 271 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
244. New Products Corp. v. City of N. Miami, 241 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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In City of Miami v. Silver,24 5 the landowner brought suit challeng-
ing a single-family residential restriction on his property as confiscatory.
The evidence revealed that the city had, over a period of years, con-
sistently resisted any attempt to change the zoning classification, while
at the same time publicly announcing its intention to acquire the prop-
erty for use as a park. Such evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding
on the part of the trial court that the restrictive zoning was adhered to
for the obvious purpose of allowing the city to acquire the property at
as low a price as possible. When used for such a purpose, the zoning
restriction is unreasonable and arbitrary to the point of confiscation, and,
as applied to the property in question, invalid and unconstitutional.
Therefore, the city was estopped to resist a higher classification of the
property.
A question of reasonableness arises not just in the application of
the zoning regulation to the property in question, but also in the classi-
fication which the zoning ordinance establishes. Thus, a restriction placed
upon land in a given classification must bear a rational and reasonable
relationship to the nature of the classification itself.
Such a reasonable relationship was found in City of Miami Beach v.
Arthree, Inc.24 6 An ordinance24 7 of the city provided that hotels consist-
ing of more than 100 rooms could have certain accessory uses, including
a stockbroker's office, a sundry shop, an art gallery, a beauty salon, and
the like. No such provision was made for apartment hotels. In the in-
stant case, the owners of a certain apartment hotel wished to maintain
such stores and offices. The trial court found that the above ordinance
attempted to restrict the use of the apartment hotel so as to prevent
them from using it in a manner similar to that of its immediate neighbor
hotels, and, therefore, was unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory and un-
constitutional insofar as its application to this hotel was concerned.
Reversing the trial court, the third district found that the distinc-
tion drawn between apartment hotels and other hotels is a reasonable
one; it is both logical and useful for the city to legislate that hotels may
operate service facilities for transient guests which are not as essential
to the more permanent guests found in an apartment hotel. Further,
since it had previously been established that the restriction of service
stores and other accessory uses was a valid exercise of the police power
as implemented through zoning regulation, 248 the zoning regulation in
question must be upheld.
Reasonableness is also a factor to be considered in weighing com-
plaints directed against the implementation of zoning regulations by the
appropriate public officials. In Dade County v. Jason,249 the landowners
245. 257 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
246. 269 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
247. Miami Beach, Fla., Ordinance 289, March 1, 1969.
248. Oceancoast Corp. v. City of Miami Beach, 203 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
249. 278 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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made formal application for a building permit. The proposed construc-
tion was in accord with existing zoning and building regulations. After
repeated efforts to secure said permit, the landowners were finally noti-
fied that they were entitled to pick up the permit upon deposit of the
necessary fee. Upon their appearance, the clerk refused to issue the per-
mit and delayed such issuance until after a building moratorium encom-
passing the land in question went into effect, at which time they were
informed that no permit would be issued.
In affirming the trial court's holding directing the issuance of the
permit, the court of appeal found that the county had delayed the is-
suance of the permit in an obvious attempt to permit the county man-
ager to issue a moratorium. The actions of the county were in bad faith
and, therefore, unreasonable, thus, the county should be estopped, under
the circumstances, to deny the issuance of the permit.
Although the municipality as well as adversely affected landowners
can challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance, such parties can under
certain circumstances be estopped from asserting same. For example, in
O.P. Corp. v. Village of North Palm Beach,250 the city enacted an ordi-
nance zoning land in question as limited commercial, which would
authorize the construction of apartment houses. No use of the land was
attempted until ten years after the enactment of the above ordinance,
when the landowner applied for and was issued a foundation building
permit for a multi-story apartment house. A second permit for another
apartment house was also issued shortly thereafter. Pursuant to said
permits, construction on the foundations commenced, at an ultimate ex-
pense of $64,000. When the foundations were substantially completed,
the city filed for a declaratory judgment, asserting its doubt as to the
validity of the ordinance in question. An adjacent landowner intervened
in this suit, claiming a real interest in the subject matter of the litigation.
Holding that the city was estopped from challenging the validity of the
ordinance, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, noted that the
actions of the city in accepting the fee and issuing the foundation permit
had caused the owner and builder to change their position in such a way
that they would suffer substantial injury if the city were permitted to
deny the right to the final permit.25' However, that same court found a
different situation to exist with respect to the surrounding landowners-
they had done nothing to induce or cause the owner to apply for a permit
or to expend money in reliance on the permit. Therefore, they were not
estopped to assert the invalidity of the ordinance.
The supreme court, reversing in part, upheld the Fourth District
as to the claim of estoppel against the city. 52 However, the court also
found that the intervenors would be estopped from asserting the claim.
250. 278 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1973).
251. O.P. Corp. v. Lewis, 266 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
252. O.P. Corp. v. Village of N. Palm Beach, 278 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1973).
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Since they had purchased their homes four years prior to their challenge
of the validity of the ordinance, knowing at the time of their purchase
that the adjacent property had been zoned for limited commercial use,
the doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence would apply to defeat their
claim.
It is not to be implied from the above that the issuance of a build-
ing permit will in all circumstances estop the city from asserting the
invalidity of the ordinance under which the permit was issued. In City
of Boynton Beach v. Carroll,253 an application for a building permit was
denied by the building official because the city had passed a resolution
prohibiting the building official from issuing a permit for any proposed
buildings higher than 45 feet. Subsequent to such denial, a new master
plan and zoning map were adopted which provided that no building
higher than 45 feet could be constructed. The landowner then sought to
compel the issuance of the permit allowing construction of a building in
excess of 45 feet. The fourth district reversed the granting of the pre-
emptory writ by the trial court, finding that the city was under no legal
duty to issue the permit for the taller building.
Following the general rule that the zoning law in effect at the time
of the final decision governs, notwithstanding the fact that there has
been a change in the law since the time of application, 25 4 no duty to issue
the permit could be found, since to do so would violate the newly enacted
master plan. Further, the possession of a building permit of itself does
not create a vested right, 5 and, therefore, the mere application for the
permit cannot create such a right. In the instant case there is no basis to
support a claim of equitable estoppel, for no detrimental reliance can be
found on the part of the landowner. Therefore, the application for issu-
ance of a building permit which would allow construction in excess of
the height limitation must be denied.
Although the issuance of a building permit does not create a vested
property right, where the landowner has in good faith made some sub-
stantial change in position or incurred extensive obligations in reliance
on the zoning law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel will create a vested
right and the permit may, therefore, not be revoked by a change of zon-
ing. The continuance of the vested right so created depends on the cir-
cumstances of each case. Generally, if the landowner's reliance took the
form of substantial expenditures that did not physically involve improve-
ments to the land, the landowner may lose his vested right by expiration
of the building permit. However, if the reliance took the form of sub-
stantial expenditures that physically involved the land, i.e., the begin-
ning of construction, the landowner cannot lose his vested right and it
cannot be revoked by a change of zoning.256
253. 272 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
254. Broach v. Young, 100 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1958).
255. Sharrow v. City of Dania, 83 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1955).
256. See City of Hollywood v. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co., 283 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1973).
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An example of the former situation is found in City of Hollywood
v. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co.25 7 The landowners had procured a build-
ing permit and spent almost $200,000 in good faith reliance on the city's
rezoning of the land in question. Based on the above principles, such
actions created a vested right in the continuation of that zoning. How-
ever, the city then notified the landowners that they could proceed with
construction, at which time the landowners declined to commence con-
struction due to the poor economic conditions. In affirming the trial
court, it was held that the failure of the landowners to proceed with con-
struction constituted a forfeiture of their vested right. The city could,
therefore, validly rezone the landowner's property to another classifica-
tion.
A claim of estoppel can arise from the failure of the city to raise an
issue in the course of litigation as well as from a detrimental reliance on
the part of the landowner. In State ex rel, Outrigger Club, Inc. v. Bark-
dull, 258 plaintiff had brought suit seeking a declaration that it was en-
titled to a building permit allowing construction in excess of a 40 foot
height limitation. The third district found that the landowners were en-
titled to a permit 259 and held that when property is located in a zoning
district which incorporates by reference the provisions of another zon-
ing district, these provisions incorporated by reference are controlling,
rather than an ordinance providing for a height limitation generally.
Upon remand, the city raised other alleged violations of the zoning ordi-
nance which had not been raised in the first hearing before the trial
court. Although the trial court refused to consider these new matters,
on appeal, the third district ordered further consideration of the claims
of the city with regard to these alleged violations. 260 The supreme court,
however, overruled the finding of the third district, and held that once
the city had an opportunity to litigate all of the issues with respect to
the zoning violations, and failed to do so, they would be estopped from
presenting these arguments the second time around. Therefore, the al-
leged violations claimed by the city could not be considered.
C. Review of Zoning Regulations
Procedures for review of decisions by administrative bodies involved
in the zoning process are provided for by statute. Specifically, Florida
Statutes section 176.16 (1971) provides that any person or persons ag-
grieved by any decision of the board of adjustment, or any taxpayer,
may present to a circuit court a petition for issuance of a writ of cer-
tiorari, claiming that such decision is illegal, in whole or in part. Although
257. 283 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
258. 277 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1973).
259. City of N. Miami v. Outrigger Club, Inc., 269 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
260. Although this decision has not been reported the supreme court in State ex rel.
Outrigger Club, Inc. v. Barkdull, 277 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1973) overruled the third district deci-
sion.
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the statute declares that "any person" may bring suit, by judicial deci-
sion the scope of those allowed to challenge zoning actions has been lim-
ited by the doctrine of standing.
In Renard v. Dade County,61 petitioner and respondents owned ad-
joining parcels. Respondents applied for a rezoning of their parcel to
multi-family residence, which was ultimately granted. During the stages
of administrative appeal, petitioner was an objector. Following adverse
rulings, petitioner sought certiorari before the circuit court, which ruled
against petitioner on the basis that having alleged no special interest, he
had no standing to prosecute the matter. On appeal, the district court
held that petitioner had sufficient standing to institute the suit, but since
the rezoning question was fairly debatable, the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed. The court, nevertheless, certified its decision as pass-
ing on a question of great public interest . 62
In passing on the question, the supreme court discussed the require-
ments for standing to sue in three different types of cases. In cases in-
volving the enforcement of a valid zoning ordinance, the rule requiring
special damages still applies. However, increased population growth and
density require a lenient application of that rule. Cases involving an at-
tack upon a validly enacted zoning ordinance as being an unreasonable
exercise of legislative power demand a different result. Although special
damages need not be shown in such case, the attackers must, neverthe-
less, have a legally recognizable interest which is adversely affected by
the proposed zoning action. The third type of case involves an attack
upon a zoning ordinance which is void because not properly enacted, as
where required notice was not given. Here, any affected resident, citizen
or property owner of the governmental unit in question may bring suit
to challenge such ordinance. 3
The instant case involves a challenge to the rezoning. Since the
rezoning was validly enacted, the case falls within the second category
above. Therefore, a showing of special damages is not needed. Further,
since petitioners were within the area where actual notice was required
to be sent prior to any rezoning hearing, they had a legally recognizable
interest. Thus, they had sufficient standing to bring suit.
In Wagner v. City of Green Cove Springs,264 the landowners inter-
vened in a suit challenging the rezoning of property across the street
from their own. Since the suit involved a challenge to the validity of a
zoning ordinance, it fell into the second category above and, therefore,
a showing of special damages was not required. Further, since they were
allowed to intervene in the original suit, any question of their interest
was thereby decided. The dismissal of their complaint for lack of stand-
ing was, therefore, improper.
261. 261 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1972).
262. 249 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
263. Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832, 837-38 (Fla. 1972).
264. 261 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1972).
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An example of a situation involving the first category above is
found in Continental Con-Dev Co. v. Shallberg.265 A building permit was
issued to landowners across the street from the plaintiff, allowing con-
struction of a building in violation of a set-back requirement of the city
code. Suit was filed seeking injunctive relief and damages. Reversing the
trial court, the fourth district found that from the record the plaintiff
did not have any damages which were different in kind from those of
all other property owners in the general area. At most there could only
be a difference in the degree of damages. Thus, plaintiff was barred from
seeking injunctive relief. However, the complaint alleged alternatively
a cause of action for damages, and plaintiff would have proper standing
to maintain such an action.
Although the circuit may hear the claim of any person aggrieved
by a zoning action,26 6 assuming such person has the requisite standing,
the court is limited as to the relief which may be granted. In City of
Miami Beach v. Breitbart,267 the district court considered the propriety
of the trial court order prohibiting the city from restricting the property
in question so that it could not be used for professional office and motel
use. Such order was found to be invalid, in that it was an expression of
the trial judge's legislative intent upon the rezoning of the property. By
this order, the trial court invaded the legislative field, a prohibited use of
power under the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, the order of the
trial court was modified so as not to apply to a specific use.
An amendment to a zoning ordinance can be challenged in the vot-
ing booth as well as in the courts, as demonstrated by City of Coral
Gables v. Carmichael .2 1 The City Commission enacted an ordinance
which amended the city's comprehensive zoning ordinance allowing
multi-family uses on a tract known as the Cocoplum Beach property.
Thereafter, a petition was prepared and submitted pursuant to the city
charter to challenge the action of the commission by a referendum of the
city's voters. After the referendum petition was filed but before the
clerk had declared the sufficiency of the petition, the city clerk was en-
joined from certifying the sufficiency of the petition until further order of
court. It was alleged, inter alia, that the referendum as provided for in the
charter would constitute a denial of due process and a denial of equal
protection of the laws, that the petition was not in accord with certain
material requirements of the charter, and that the ordinance was not
legislative but rather quasi-judicial and, therefore, not subject to refer-
endum. Following final hearing, the trial court permanently enjoined the
clerk from certifying the petition, stating only that "the equities of this
cause are found to be with the plaintiff." '269
265. 267 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
266. FLA. STAT. § 176.16 (1971).
267. 280 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
268. 256 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Carmichael].
269. Id. at 407.
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On appeal, all material allegations of the plaintiff were found to be
wanting, the injunction was quashed, and the referendum allowed to
proceed. First, a long line of cases clearly establish that an amendment
to a comprehensive zoning ordinance is legislative, rather than quasi-judicial in nature-it would be clearly inconsistent to hold that the en-
actment of an ordinance is legislative, while the amendment of that ordi-
nance is not.2 10 Further, a city charter may provide that any ordinance
passed by the commission may be subjected to referendum vote."7'
Such referendum vote is cumulative and alternative to the legislative
power that is conferred on the commission. Since it is legislative in na-
ture, under the doctrine of separation of powers such process should not
be impeded or prevented by the courts in the absence of demonstrated
illegality.
Similarly, in Carmichael, the claims of denial of due process and
equal protection were dismissed. As stated by the court,
The proponents and opponents are given all the privileges and
rights to express themselves in an open election that a democ-
racy or republican form of government can afford to its citizens
upon any municipal or public affair.2 72
Therefore, in the absence of any showing of illegality, the court should
not interfere.
D. Exceptions
Although the zoning ordinance must be drawn pursuant to a com-
prehensive plan, 78 it is not to be inferred that all development must be
in conformity with the use districts resulting from such plan. In Jeffer-
son National Bank v. City of Miami Beach,274 the landowner applied
for a permit to use its lot for parking purposes, but was refused. It then
filed its action in the trial court and suffered an adverse ruling. On ap-
peal, the landowner urged, inter alia, that the trial court denied it the
equal protection of the law and discriminated against it in that the zon-
ing ordinance would have permitted the city to operate a public parking
lot on the parcel if it so desired. This contention was rejected on the
grounds that the zoning authority has the right, upon adoption of a
comprehensive zoning ordinance, to exempt itself from the regulations
applicable to private interests. The erection of a parking garage has
been held to be a governmental function,275 and governmental functions
270. E.g., City of Miami Beach v. Schauer, 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1959), discharging cert.
to 104 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
271. MLAn BEACH CHARTER § 21.
272. City of Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d 404, 409 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972),
quoting Dwyer v. City Council of Berkeley, 200 Cal. 505, 508, 253 P. 932, 936 (1927).
273. FLA. STAT. § 3176.04 (1971).
274. 267 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
275. Stott v. City of Manchester, 109 N.H. 59, 242 A.2d 58 (1968).
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are usually considered exceptions to general use limitations permitted in
a zoned use district. Therefore, no denial of equal protection could be
found.
In Metropolitan Dade County v. Parkway Towers Condominium
Assoc.,"' the above rule was seemingly extended to those situations
where there is no express exemption within the zoning ordinance in fa-
vor of the governmental body. The county decided to locate a facility
for the housing of prisoners on a parcel which did not provide for such
use. Suit was filed by adjoining landowners to enjoin construction. Dis-
solving the temporary injunction that had issued, it was held that the
county was not required to seek a zoning change on the property in-
volved in order to construct such facility. This result was predicated on
the recognition of a common law privilege on the part of a governmental
entity to place a governmental facility without regard to a comprehen-
sive zoning ordinance or its procedures. Although this privilege may be
waived, waiver will only be found on a showing of affirmative action by
the governmental entity in the adoption of the zoning ordinance, such
as an express provision for the location of the facility in question within
another zone. Since in the instant case the zoning ordinance contained
no provision for the location of prisoner facilities, a claim of waiver
could not be supported.
X. CONDOMINIUMS
A. Statutory Provisions
It is provided by statute that a condominium may be created on
lands owned in fee simple or held under a lease having a term in excess
of ninety-eight years by recording a declaration of condominium in the
appropriate records."' In Ackerman v. Spring Lake of Broward, Inc.,7
it was held that such statute did not preclude the submission of the rec-
reation area to condominium ownership for a term of 99 years where the
housing part of the condominium property was submitted to condomin-
ium ownership in fee simple. However, the submission of the recreation
area to condominium ownership presented a question as to the validity
of recreation leases entered into between the developer and the unit
owners. Once the recreation area was submitted to condominium owner-
ship, the recreation area became part of the common elements of the
condominium during the term of the estate for years. The developer,
then, had no present possessory interest in the property which it could
validly lease to the individual unit owners. Therefore, the finding of the
trial court that such leases were valid was reversed.
By statute, the administration and management of the condominium
276. 281 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
277. FLA. STAT. § 711.08(1) (1971).
278. 260 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
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property is the responsibility of the condominium association, such asso-
ciation to be composed of owners of units in the condominium.2 7 9 In
Point East Management Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp.
2 80
the court had before it the question of whether such responsibility could
be delegated by contract to one outside of the association.
Prior to the sale of the condominium units to the purchasers there-
of, the developers caused long-term contracts to be made between the
association and the developer-controlled management corporation for
the management of the condominium associations. The individual con-
dominium units were then sold subject to these long term management
contracts. The trial court held, inter alia, that these management con-
tracts were invalid in that they contained provisions contrary to the direc-
tion and intent of the Condominium Act.28' The third district affirmed,
holding that the contract in question operated to divest from the condo-
minium association in a material and substantial degree the power and
privilege granted it by statute to operate the condominium, and, thus,
was invalid. 8 2 The supreme court, however, found that the legislature,
by placing in the condominium associations the power and duty to man-
age the condominium properties, did not intend to restrict the ability of
the associations to contract for the management of the associations.
The supreme court summarily dismissed the argument presented by
the association, the trial court, and the district court of appeal. After
declaring that recission of the contracts would not lie merely because
they arose from dealings of the developers with themselves while they
constituted all of the members of the condominium associations and of
the management corporations, the court stated:
We cannot agree with the District Court of Appeal that the
Legislature, by placing in the condominium associations the
power and duty to manage the condominium properties, in-
tended to restrict the ability of the associations to contract for
the management of the associations. 8
In support of this conclusion, it was argued that since the legislature
enacted a remedial statute which allowed the owners of condominium
units to cancel initial management contracts by a vote of 75 percent,
28 4
it must be assumed that the legislature recognized the existence of and
chose not to abolish such management contracts.
279. FLA. STAT. §§ 711.03(2), 711.12(1) (1971).
280. 282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973).
281. FLA. STAT. ch. 711 (1971).
282. Point East Mgmt. Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 258 So. 2d 322
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
283. Point East Mgmt. Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628,
630 (Fla. 1973).
284. FLA. STAT. § 711.30 (1971). By its express terms, this statute is applicable only to
original management contracts entered into by the association subsequent to January 1, 1971,
and thus does not provide a basis of relief to the association in the instant case.
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The court's reasoning is at best a non sequitur. Though this argu-
ment might support the proposition that the association has the power
to contract, it offers no answer as to whether that power is limited. As
argued by Justice Ervin in his dissent, the fact that the legislature be-
came more aware of the problem inherent in such management contracts
and acted to provide remedies against future injustices does not mean
that the courts are powerless to strike down a contract clearly violative
of other provisions of the Condominium Act.2" 5 Finally, the court con-
cluded that since the terms of the management contract were available
to all who purchased units in the condominium, enforcement of the con-
tract against them cannot be said to work a hardship.
B. Rentals
In the absence of an express use limitation contained within the
declaration of condominium, there appears to be no restriction on the
unit owner's right to lease the condominium unit to a tenant. However,
the operation of such lease would be subject to the limitation contained
within the declaration of condominium and rules promulgated by the
condominium association." 6 Further, since the lessee is not a member of
that association, his ability to interject himself into the affairs of the
condominium is limited.
A situation involving the above principles is found in Tietig v.
Kusik.8 7 A condominium unit was rented to the tenant for a term. After
several months, the tenant began to be harassed by two officers of the
condominium association and warned against the use of certain facilities.
The tenant thereafter abandoned the premises, and the owner of the
unit brought an action for rent due.
In finding for the owner, the court rejected the tenant's counter-
claim based on a constructive eviction and denial of quiet use and en-
joyment of the leased premises. Since the alleged constructive eviction
fell short of actual eviction, and was susceptible to remedy, the tenant
had to give timely notice to the landlord of the objectionable act and
demand rectification.288 Under the facts of this case, the notice require-
ment was even more compelling; the landlord is owner of the condo-
minium unit and therefore has authority on his tenant's behalf to inter-
ject himself into the affairs of the condominium.289 Finally, the landlord
and unit owner is seemingly protected by Florida Statutes section 711.-
18(2) (1971), which precludes a unit owner's personal liability from
285. Point East Mgmt. Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628, 630
(Fla. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
286. FLA. STAT. § 711.12 (1971).
287. 279 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
288. Richards v. Dodge, 150 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
289. Point East Mgmt. Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628. 630
(Fla. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
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any damages caused by the association in connection with the use of the
common elements.
The right of a unit owner to lease his condominium unit is not an
unlimited one, for the declaration of condominium can restrict such
right. In Holiday Out in America v. Bowes, 290 a provision of the dec-
laration of condominium granted the developer the exclusive right to
rent the units, and to retain a percentage of the rental as a fee for such
services. Such provision was held to be valid and not an unreasonable
restraint on alienation. Although the property may be less desirable and
hence less valuable than it would be if not subject to the rental restric-
tions, the unit owners are, nevertheless, free to convey the fee title to
the property at any time and to any one in exactly the same state they
acquired it. Thus, no restraint on alienation could be found. However,
it was also held that the manager could not extract his percentage fee,
due to the fact that he was not registered as a real estate broker. Al-
though an exemption from the licensing provisions applies to the activ-
ities of the manager of a condominium in relation to the renting of indi-
vidual units when acting on behalf of an owner who has an interest in
no more than one unit,291 such provision did not apply in the instant
case since the plaintiff owned two units.
290. 285 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
291. FLA. STAT. § 475.131 (1971).
